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ABSTRACT
Professor Mark Roe explained that the shareholder wealth
maximization norm (“the norm”) is not appropriate for a country with a
(quasi) monopoly, because the norm encourages managers to maximize
monopoly rents to the detriment of the national economy. This Article
provides new findings and counter-intuitive arguments on the tension
created by the norm and (quasi) monopoly, by exploring three key
corporate governance concepts that Roe did not examine—(1)
“controlling minority structure” (CMS), where dominant shareholders
hold a fractional ownership in their controlled-corporations, (2)
“tunneling” (i.e., the transfer of corporate wealth to controlling
shareholders), and (3) Chinese state-owned enterprises (SOEs).
First, given (quasi) monopoly, this Article considers the impact of
CMS. CMS controllers, due to their fractional economic interests (e.g.,
5% ownership), do not have a strong incentive to vigorously follow the
norm. When the norm is not actively sought, public shareholders lose the
opportunity to gain the maximum monopoly profits. A positive byproduct,
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however, is that national welfare is improved, since non-maximized
monopoly profits do not hurt society and consumers to the fullest extent.
Second, given CMS and (quasi) monopoly, this Article analyzes
the impact of tunneling. Since tunneling provides more cash flows—
including illicit cash flows—to CMS controllers, it strengthens their
incentive to maximize shareholder wealth. The direct effect of tunneling
to public shareholders is, by definition, negative. Counter-intuitively,
however, tunneling is indirectly beneficial—to some extent—to public
shareholders, due to CMS controllers’ reinforced incentive to increase
profits. Thus, the net effect of tunneling on public shareholders is mixed.
In regard to social welfare in (quasi) monopoly CMS, tunneling has a
negative effect because it encourages CMS controllers to pursue
monopoly rents in a more aggressive manner.
Third, this Article calls into question the effectiveness of the norm
in a context of Chinese SOEs that do their business in domestic markets.
Formally, the controlling shareholder of Chinese SOEs is the party-state.
The party-state is, however, an agent of its citizens, who are the “ultimate
shareholders” (and consumers). Given the (quasi) monopoly held by
SOEs in China, the norm will encourage SOE managers to set a
monopoly-profit maximizing price in domestic markets. Such pricing is
beneficial to the citizens of China as the “ultimate shareholders” when the
government holds a high percentage of ownership in an SOE. However,
the pricing damages the citizens of China as consumers. Under certain
circumstances, the combined effect of the norm on the “ultimate
shareholders”—i.e., the citizens of China—could be a net loss if a
significant amount of welfare in society disappears as dead-weight loss
(DWL) in the national economy.
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I.
INTRODUCTION
Industrial organization and corporate governance are two
significant topics when corporations pursue business goals, make strategic
decisions, and deal with internal affairs. Academics—both economists
and legal scholars—and policy-makers tend to treat these two fields
independently except in a few cases like mergers and acquisitions (M&A).
This treatment simultaneously brings issues associated with monopoly
regulation and investor protection.
Generally, (quasi) monopoly—monopoly with the sole supplier,3
and oligopoly, where a small number of market players wield a high level
of price-setting power 4 —is deemed detrimental to society. Most
jurisdictions impose regulations on (quasi) monopoly via antitrust laws,
competition laws, and laws against large business entities.5 One primary
rationale for economics to regulate imperfect competition in a market is
that a (quasi) monopolist charges a higher price, while supplying a smaller
quantity of a good or service than it would in a competitive market. This
action transfers some of the economic surplus from consumers to the
monopolist.6 In addition, “monopoly produces a net loss for society:” 7
namely, a deadweight loss (DWL). Aside from this efficiency loss, a
variety of fairness problems will emerge and cause many socio-political
controversies.8
Meanwhile, mainstream corporate governance scholarship, as
exemplified by Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., articulates that the primary goal

3

ROBERT B. COOTER JR. & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS 29 (Int’l ed., 6th ed. 2014)
(“In a monopoly there is only one supplier; so, that firm and the industry are identical.”).
Some scholars, practitioners, and policy-makers defend certain patterns and types of
monopolies, such as natural monopolies and monopolies that enhance innovation. See, e.g.,
ROBERT S. PINDYCK & DANIEL L. RUBINFELD, MICROECONOMICS 388 (Global ed., 8th ed.
2015) (explaining the concept of natural monopoly). Such discussions on monopoly,
though important, are beyond the scope of this Article. For more explanation of economies
of scale and a natural monopoly, see infra Part II.B.2.
4
In general, oligopoly is defined as “a market structure in which a small number of interdependent firms compete.” R. GLENN HUBBARD & ANTHONY PATRICK O’BRIEN,
MICROECONOMICS 432 (3rd. ed. 2010). In this Article, oligopoly is narrowly defined as a
market, where a few market players exercise dominant market power in terms of setting a
price and/or the level of quantity. If a small number of suppliers fiercely compete in a
market without dominant market power, such a market structure does not constitute
oligopoly in this Article. In other words, when defining oligopoly, this Article focuses on
individual corporations’ market power rather than simply the number of corporations in a
specific market. See infra Part II.B.
5
For instance, China promulgated the Anti-Monopoly Law in 2007, taking effect in 2008.
Xiaoye Wang, Highlights of China’s New Anti-Monopoly Law, 75 ANTITRUST L.J. 133,
133 n.3 (2008).
6
PAUL KRUGMAN & ROBIN WELLS, MICROECONOMICS 371 (2nd ed. 2009).
7
Id.
8
See infra Part II.B.1.

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/alr/vol11/iss1/4

132

U. OF PENNSYLVANIA ASIAN LAW REVIEW Vol. 11

of a corporation is to maximize shareholder wealth, 9 which is usually
expressed as share price. This view is also supported by Nobel laureate,
Milton Friedman, in his famous essay The Social Responsibility of
Business Is to Increase Its Profits.10 As the world economy has integrated,
shareholder wealth maximization—in tandem with the shareholder
primacy norm—has grown as an influential international standard.11
However, in The Shareholder Wealth Maximization Norm and
Industrial Organization, Professor Mark Roe at Harvard Law School
called into question the fundamental validity of shareholder primacy. “In
nations where product markets are not strongly competitive, a strong
shareholder primacy norm fits less comfortably with national wealth
maximization than elsewhere because, where competition is weak,
shareholder primacy induces managers to cut production and raise price
more than they otherwise would.” 12 (emphasis added). By analyzing
potentially conflicting features of shareholder primacy in a given
industrial organization, Roe pioneered uncharted territory in corporate
governance. Perhaps, while the shareholder wealth maximization norm is
a better standard for the United States, where markets are relatively more
competitive, it might not be “the” global standard, particularly in
developing countries with an imperfectly competitive market tainted by
monopolistic features.
Regarding the tension between shareholder primacy and (quasi)
monopoly, this Article examines three key factors that were not covered in
Roe’s insightful research: (1) “controlling minority structure” (CMS) (i.e.,
when dominant shareholders hold a small percentage of ownership);13 (2)
9

Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668, 684 (Mich. 1919).
Milton Friedman, The Social Responsibility of Business Is to Increase Its Profits, THE
N.Y. TIMES MAG. Sep. 13, 1970, at 33. But see Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Rise of
Independent Directors in the United States: Of Shareholder Value and Stock Market Prices,
59 STAN. L. REV. 1465, 1520 (2007) (“Milton Friedman’s 1970 essay, The Social
Responsibility of Business Is to Increase Its Profits, was a scandale because of its
unvarnished emphasis on the shareholder value as virtually the sole criterion by which
corporate performance should be judged. This view seemed far out of the mainstream.”).
11
Some corporate law scholars explain that the concept of “shareholder wealth
maximization” is a subset of the broadly defined concept of “shareholder primacy.” See,
e.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director v. Shareholder Primacy in the Convergence Debate,
16 TRANSNAT’L LAW. 45, 45-46 (2002) (“The term shareholder primacy typically connotes
two distinct principles: (1) [t]he shareholder wealth maximization norm . . . [and] (2) [t]he
principle of ultimate shareholder control.”). In this Article, however, the term “shareholder
primacy” is narrowly defined, so that it is used interchangeably with “shareholder wealth
maximization” (thus “shareholder primacy” is not related to the concept of the “principle
of ultimate shareholder control”).
12
Mark J. Roe, The Shareholder Wealth Maximization Norm and Industrial Organization,
149 U. PA. L. REV. 2063, 2063 (2001).
13
In CMS, for example, a controlling shareholder holding a 5% economic interest in a
corporation can wield 51% of the voting rights. See generally, Lucian A. Bebchuk et al.,
Stock Pyramids, Cross-Ownership, and Dual Class Equity: The Mechanisms and Agency
10
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“tunneling” (i.e., wealth transfer from a corporation to its controlling
shareholder); 14 and (3) state-owned enterprises (SOEs) in China.
Traditionally, policy-makers and corporate governance scholars have
criticized institutional features in emerging markets such as CMS and
tunneling. Also, Chinese SOEs have been considered highly inefficient
due to their low profitability.15 In the analytical framework of shareholder
wealth maximization and (quasi) monopoly, examining these three factors
provides new implications on the interplay between corporate governance
and industrial organization.
Recognizing the significance and complicated functions of CMS,
tunneling, and Chinese SOEs, this Article explores further research
questions: (1) Given (quasi) monopoly, how does CMS affect shareholder
wealth maximization, investor protection, and social welfare?;16 (2) Given
(quasi) monopoly and CMS, how does tunneling affect shareholder wealth
maximization, investor protection, and social welfare?;17 and (3) Given the
(quasi) monopolistic market power of Chinese SOEs, is there a chance
that the shareholder wealth maximization norm will actually lower
benefits to the (ultimate) shareholders of Chinese SOEs? 18 To answer
these questions, this Article provides new novel ideas and findings, some
of which are counter-intuitive and contrary to the belief of extant
corporate governance scholarship.
In a country with (quasi) monopoly, three outcomes will arise
when a controller’s percentage of ownership is substantially low, ceteris
paribus (note that tunneling is not considered yet). 19 First, the CMS
Costs of Separating Control from Cash-Flow Rights, in CONCENTRATED CORPORATE
OWNERSHIP
295
(Randall
K.
Morck
ed.,
2000),
available
at
http://www.nber.org/chapters/c9013.pdf (explaining CMS, voting leverage devices, and
agency problems in CMS); see also, infra Part III.A.1 (providing a further explanation of
CMS). Due to its distortive features in shareholder voting, CMS is related to many
corporate governance issues such as agency problems, investor protection, and takeover
defenses. See, e.g., Sang Yop Kang, Transplanting a Poison Pill to Controlling
Shareholder Regimes—Why It Is So Difficult, 33 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 619, 641-42
(2013) (describing CMS as an “internal defensive device” in a takeover situation).
14
See generally, Simeon Djankov et al., The Law and Economics of Self-Dealing, 88 J. FIN.
ECON. 430 (2008) (discussing corporate governance issues related to investor
expropriation); Simon Johnson et al., Tunneling, 90 AM. ECON. REV. 22 (2000) (explaining
the concept of tunneling).
15
See, e.g., Fixing China Inc: Reform of State Companies Is Back on the Agenda, THE
ECONOMIST, (Aug. 30, 2014), http://www.economist.com/news/china/21614240-reformstate-companies-back-agenda-fixing-china-inc (“Profitability of state companies has fallen,
even as private firms have grown in strength. SOE returns are now about half those of
their non-state peers.”).
16
For a further analysis of this question, see infra Part III.A and B.
17
For a further analysis of this question, see infra Part III.C.
18
For a further analysis of this question, see infra Part IV.
19
See infra Part III.A and B (explaining potential outcomes of the CMS controllers’ weak
incentive to follow the shareholder wealth maximization norm).
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controller will have a weak incentive to strictly follow the profit
maximization norm, since economic interests between a controller and the
monopolist corporation are less aligned. Second, as a result, public
investors’ economic interests are likely to be damaged, since deviation
from profit maximization lowers the price and profits in monopoly. Third,
however, it is likely that the total efficiency of an economy, as well as
consumer surplus, will be enhanced as the controller deviates from
monopoly profit maximization.
Note that in (quasi) monopoly
shareholder wealth maximization is defined as monopoly rent
maximization. Essentially, in terms of the level of welfare, the “square of
a bad” (or “Bad2”)—the situation where a bad ownership structure of
CMS and a bad industrial organization of (quasi) monopoly are
combined20—is socially desirable to some extent.21 CMS is also attractive
to controlling family shareholders in China due to the feature of utilizing
other people’s money. Since markets in China are less competitive, the
foregoing discussion—based on the combination of CMS and (quasi)
monopoly—provides similar implications in the Chinese context.
When a CMS controller does not actively pursue monopoly profit
maximization, all shareholders including the controller, bear the
“opportunity cost” of losing monopoly profits that could have belonged to
the shareholders. By the definition of CMS, the controller’s opportunity
cost is fractional. Thus, when a CMS controller finds it personally more
desirable to not seek shareholder wealth maximization, the controller is
willing to assume this fractional opportunity cost. For instance, by
supplying more quantity of a good or service, a CMS controller can
enlarge the size of a monopoly corporation. 22 The controller will lose
some monopoly profits on a pro-rata basis in the form of an opportunity
cost. On the other hand, the controller may absorb benefits from the
enlargement almost solely for himself or herself. In politics as well as in
business, the size of a business often reflects the power of the controller.
Alternatively, a CMS controller sometimes imposes personal philosophy
onto corporate policy. To illustrate, Jack Ma pledged that the goal of
Alibaba was to make customers and employees better off, 23 which is
reminiscent of Henry Ford’s philanthropy in Dodge. In the case of a CMS,
the CMS controllers are the only ones psychologically compensated when
their own belief is realized in the corporation’s policy while all
shareholders—including the CMS controllers—bear the opportunity cost.
20

See infra Part III.A.2.
Despite the positive effects of the “square of a bad,” however, other problems of (quasi)
monopoly and CMS may persist. See infra Part III.D.
22
See, e.g., Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The End of History for Corporate
Law, 89 GEO. L.J. 439, 461 (2000) (observing that controlling shareholders pursue “nonpecuniary returns,” particularly in Europe).
23
See infra Part III.B.2 (explaining Jack Ma’s CMS and his policy of “customer first,
employees second, shareholders third”).
21
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In addition, their reputation—rather than that of the entire shareholders—
is enhanced, resulting in benefits to their future career.
Now, consider the effects of a CMS controller’s tunneling, when a
jurisdiction’s market structures are based on (quasi) monopoly and CMS.
This situation is described as the “cube of a bad” (or “Bad3”), since
another bad feature (i.e., tunneling) is added on top of the “square of a
bad.”24 In this situation, three outcomes will arise as the level of tunneling
is higher, ceteris paribus. First, ironically, a CMS controller will have a
stronger incentive to pursue the profit maximization norm. This is
because the controller’s economic interests in a corporation are
strengthened through additional pecuniary benefits from tunneling.
Second, tunneling is, by definition, detrimental to public shareholders.25
On the other hand, however, due to the first outcome, tunneling will be—
counter-intuitively—beneficial to public shareholders at least to some
extent, since shareholder wealth maximization will be induced by
tunneling. 26 As a result, the net effect of tunneling on the welfare of
public investors will depend on the relative size of the two opposing
effects.27 However, extreme tunneling will take away public investors’
confidence in a corporation and, eventually, most of them will not invest
in the next stage. 28 Third, the level of consumer surplus and national
welfare will deteriorate as a CMS controller’s strengthened incentive to
follow shareholder wealth maximization increases monopoly profits and
generates larger DWL. Since the quality of corporate governance in
China is still low, the aforementioned three outcomes—generated from
24

For the further analysis of the “cube of a bad” (or Bad 3), see infra Part III.C (explaining
potential outcomes of tunneling in (quasi) monopoly CMS, with respect to the shareholder
wealth maximization norm).
25
See Djankov et al., supra note 14, at 430 (explaining “the problem of investor
expropriation, sometimes also referred to as self-dealing or tunneling”); Johnson et al.,
supra note 14, at 22 (describing tunneling as “the expropriation of minority shareholders”).
26
In this sense, the logic is also connected to an argument that public shareholders are not
“unilateral victims,” since they participate in profit sharing with a controlling shareholder
when surplus is transferred from consumers to a corporation in an imperfect competitive
market. See Sang Yop Kang, Re-envisioning the Controlling Shareholder Regime: Why
Controlling Shareholders and Minority Shareholders Often Embrace, 16 U. PA. J. BUS. L.
843, 893-94 (2014) (discussing how minority shareholders may benefit when a controller
“loots” other stakeholders).
27
Note that I do not argue that the net effect of tunneling on public shareholders is positive.
What I explain is the possibility that public shareholders could—indirectly and
inadvertently—benefit from tunneling to some extent, which has been largely ignored in
discussing corporate governance issues.
28
Accordingly, a CMS controller, if he or she wishes to be a repeat player, would not
choose an over-reaching level of tunneling. See generally Sang Yop Kang, “Generous
Thieves”: The Puzzle of Controlling Shareholder Arrangements in Bad-Law Jurisdictions,
SOC. SCI. RESEARCH NETWORK (2013), http://ssrn.com/abstract_id=2305645 (explaining
that a controlling shareholder tends to generously expropriate other investors when she/he
is a repeat player).
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tunneling, CMS, and (quasi) monopoly—will be likely to apply to
controlling family shareholders in China.
Next, in the context of shareholder primacy, let us theoretically
examine Chinese SOEs, particularly those who are (quasi) monopolies in
the domestic market (or a local market). 29 Two implications are
noteworthy.30 First, as opposed to common sense, the shareholder wealth
maximization norm—if implemented without reforming the established
(quasi) monopoly of SOEs—could be counterproductive to China. This is
because the norm will encourage the managers of SOEs to reduce the
quantity of a good or service and to charge a higher price in China. These
actions will result in more monopoly profits, but at the loss of national
welfare.31
Second, in Chinese SOEs supplying goods or services
predominantly for domestic consumers, it is possible that the shareholder
wealth maximization norm would also be harmful to the (ultimate)
shareholders. Formally, the controlling shareholder of Chinese SOEs is
the party-state (or the government). However, the state is a primary agent
of the citizens of China, who are indeed the “ultimate shareholders.” 32
Thus, at least in theory, the citizens of China collectively (and indirectly)
own an SOE, particularly when the party-state holds 100% (or a high
percentage) of ownership. Meanwhile, the citizens of China are, roughly
speaking, the same as the consumer group of SOEs doing business in the
domestic market. At a glance, it seems that a corporate policy based on
the shareholder wealth maximization norm will enhance the level of
profits in favor of the “ultimate shareholders.” However, these profits are
transferred from the consumer group, which is actually the group of
“ultimate shareholders.” Thus, the transfer takes place simply from the
right pocket to the left pocket. A more systemic problem is that, during
the course of the wealth transfer, a large amount of welfare will disappear
29

See infra Part IV (explaining negative potential outcomes that the shareholder wealth
maximization norm brings in Chinese SOEs).
30
These implications might also apply to similarly situated SOEs in other countries. Note,
however, that these implications are more meaningful to China, since China is officially a
communist economy where SOEs play a key role. See infra Part IV.
31
For the same reasons, it is possible that there will be similar unintended (undesirable)
consequences if a stock option arrangement—designed to align the managers’ incentive
with shareholder wealth—is widely adopted in these SOEs. Since a stock option is a
vehicle that incentivizes SOE managers to attempt to maximize monopoly rents, it is
possible in China that a stock option can generate a great deal of DWL and hurt domestic
consumers, the citizens of China, who are “ultimate shareholders” of SOEs. For the
concept of “ultimate shareholders” of SOEs, see infra note 32 and accompanying text.
Currently, I am conducting an independent research project to explore these issues related
to stock options in China.
32
For a similar view, see Donald C. Clarke, Corporate Governance in China: An Overview,
14 CHINA ECON. REV. 494, 499 (describing the citizens of China as “the ultimate
theoretical principal in the case of state ownership”).
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in the form of DWL.
Consequently, when shareholder wealth
maximization applies to Chinese SOEs playing in industries for domestic
demand, the net worth of “ultimate shareholders” will be lowered.
This Article is organized as follows. Part II introduces the
concepts of (quasi) monopoly and shareholder wealth maximization,
Roe’s insight into those concepts, and the three factors (i.e., CMS,
tunneling, and Chinese SOEs) that Roe did not emphasize. Part III
explores intricately inter-related issues—such as CMS, tunneling, a
controller’s weak incentive to follow profit maximization, investor
protection, and social welfare—in the context of the tension between
monopoly and shareholder primacy. Part IV covers separate topics from
Part III. 33 Regarding the tension, Part IV explores the relationship in
China among SOEs, the government, and the citizens of China. Part V
summarizes and concludes.
II.

TENSION BETWEEN MONOPOLY AND SHAREHOLDER
WEALTH MAXIMIZATION
This Part begins with theories on shareholder wealth
maximization and monopoly. Subsequently, it covers both the insight and
missing factors from Roe’s article. A fundamental tension between
(quasi) monopoly and shareholder wealth maximization will be
emphasized.
A. Shareholder Wealth Maximization
According to U.S. corporate governance scholarship, the primary
aim of a corporation is to maximize shareholder value. 34 Basically,
shareholder wealth maximization is rooted in the fundamental belief that
corporate agents’ fiduciary duties should be discharged for shareholders as
explained by Aronson v. Lewis.35
1. Shareholder Primacy Norm in the United States
In the United States, the shareholder wealth maximization
principle was pronounced in the famous case of Dodge v. Ford Motor
Company. 36 Henry Ford, the majority shareholder of Ford Motor
33

Part IV does not explore issues related to CMS and tunneling.
See, e.g., Bainbridge, supra note 11, at 45 (“This principle [of shareholder wealth
maximization] is well-established in U.S. corporate law.”).
35
Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805 (Del. 1984) (citing Loft, Inc. v. Guth, 2 A.2d 225 (Del.
Ch. 1938)).
36
Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668 (Mich. 1919). Dodge is often considered the
leading case on shareholder primacy in the United States. See, e.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge,
Director Primacy: The Means and Ends of Corporate Governance, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 547,
574-75 (2002) (explaining Dodge in the context of shareholder wealth maximization).
34
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Company—a very lucrative business—reinvested earnings, lowered prices
for consumers, and enhanced working conditions for employees. 37 The
Dodge brothers, minority shareholders of Ford Motor Company, brought
suit and demanded that the company pay more dividends.38 Ford defended
his policy of withholding profits inside the company, based on his belief
of the corporation as a public good. For instance, he testified that his
“ambition” was to make employees better off. 39 Ford’s altruism for
consumers was also pointed out in the case: “[Mr. Ford] thinks the Ford
Motor Company . . . has had too large profits, and that, although large
profits might be still earned, a sharing of them with the public, by
reducing the price of the output of the company, ought to be
undertaken.”40 Emphasizing that the primary goal of a corporation is to
make profits for stockholders,41 the Court articulated that “[t]he discretion
of directors is to be exercised in the choice of means to attain that end, and
does not extend to a change in the end itself, to the reduction of profits, or
to the non[-]distribution of profits among stockholders in order to devote
them to other purposes.”42 The Court ruled in favor of the Dodge brothers.
The spirit of shareholder primacy is also well preserved in the
current case law in Delaware, the center of modern United States
corporate law. 43 For instance, Judge Leo Strine explained that “our
corporate law (and that of most of our nation) expects that the directors of
a solvent firm will cause the firm to undertake economic activities that
maximize the value of the firm’s cash flows primarily for the benefit of
the residual risk-bearers, the owners of the firm’s equity capital.” 44
(emphasis added). Traditionally, shareholders are considered the “owners”
of a corporation. 45 If so, the idea of maximizing net benefits for a
corporation’s owners is easily justified. Even if shareholders are not

Some scholars are, however, critical of the implications of Dodge. See, e.g., Lynn A. Stout,
Why We Should Stop Teaching Dodge v. Ford, 3 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 163 (2008).
37
See Bainbridge, supra note 36, at 574-75.
38
See, e.g., Stout, supra note 36, at 164-65 (providing a further explanation of the case);
see also Bainbridge, supra note 36, at 574-75.
39
Dodge, 170 N.W. at 683.
40
Id. at 683-84.
41
Id. at 684 (“A business corporation is organized and carried on primarily for the profit of
the stockholders.”).
42
Id.
43
See, e.g., Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Toward an Interest-Group Theory of
Delaware Corporate Law, 65 TEX. L. REV. 469, 490 (explaining how the center of the
modern U.S. corporate law changed from New Jersey to Delaware).
44
Production Resources Group, L.L.C. v. NCT Group, Inc. 863 A.2d 772, 787 (Del. Ch.
2004) (citing Roe, supra note 12).
45
See, e.g., Shareholder Rights: Power to the Owners, THE ECONOMIST (Mar. 9, 2013),
http://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21573121-activist-shareholders-are-right-mountbarricades-politicians-are-wrong-cap (explaining the notion of shareholders as owners of a
company in a context of shareholder activism).
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precisely the “owners” of a corporation,46 the notion of shareholders as
“residual claimants” buttresses the principle of shareholder wealth
maximization. This theory posits that shareholder wealth maximization is
optimal in a corporation, since other constituencies of a corporation (such
as employees, suppliers, creditors, and even the government 47 ) already
receive their cash flows before the shareholders do. 48 As a result,
shareholder wealth maximization, as long as it is achieved in a proper
manner with fair treatment and protection of other constituencies, 49
improves Pareto efficiency without hurting the welfare of other
constituencies.50
2. Shareholder Primacy Norm Outside the United States
Outside the United States, many jurisdictions have started to
seriously consider the notion of shareholder protection. For instance,
Korea has made a series of corporate law reforms since the Asian financial
crisis in 1997. In general, the direction of these reforms has been
consistent with the shareholder primacy norm. 51 In Korea, shareholder
derivative suits have been raised—though the frequency is less than that of
the United States, (perhaps) the most active jurisdiction in the world—

46

There are commentators who explain that shareholders are not owners of a corporation.
See, e.g., Martin Lipton & William Savitt, The Many Myths of Lucian Bebchuk, 93 VA. L.
REV. 733, 754 (2007) (“Shareholders do not ‘own’ corporations. They own securities—
shares of stock—which entitle them to very limited electoral rights and the right to share in
the financial returns produced by the corporation’s business operations.”); see also
Bainbridge, supra note 36, at 551 (introducing a similar view).
47
The government receives cash flows from a corporation in the form of corporate taxes,
before shareholders receive cash flows such as dividends.
48
Recall that shareholders are residual claimants of a corporation, but note that this
argument can be weakened when other constituencies are not properly protected. See
Production Resources Group, 863 A.2d at 787 (explaining shareholder wealth
maximization based on the assumption that creditors are already protected by contractual
agreements, the law of fraudulent conveyance, and federal bankruptcy law).
49
See Roe, supra note 12, at 2065 (“In the long run, the argument goes, employees and
other stakeholders are overall better off with fluid and efficient capital markets, managers
need a simple metric to follow, and both wealth and, in the end, fairness are maximized by
shareholders being the corporation’s residual beneficiary, with the other claimants getting
what they want via contract with the corporation.”).
50
As to the concept of Pareto efficiency, see PINDYCK & RUBINFELD, supra note 3, at 598
(“In a Pareto efficient allocation of goods, no one can be made better off without making
someone else worse off.”).
51
In addition to voluntary reforms inside Korea, such a significant alteration is partly due
to external influence from the international community and creditor institutions. See, e.g.,
Hwa-Jin Kim, Living with the IMF: A New Approach to Corporate Governance and
Regulation of Financial Institutions in Korea, 17 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 61, 62 (1999) (“The
process of reform was hastened by the foreign exchange crisis of 1997 and the
consequential involvement of the international lending agencies such as the International
Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank in the restructuring of Korean industries.”).
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since the first derivative suit case against the Korea First Bank in 1997.52
In China, reforms have strengthened protection for shareholders although
it did not experience a major financial crisis comparable to the Asian
financial crisis in 1997. For instance, the derivative suit system has
gradually developed 53 and the notion of independent directors has been
emphasized in a significant manner.54
In addition, shareholder activism—such as hedge funds’
aggressive investment and participation in the decision-making processes
in corporations—in line with the shareholder wealth maximization norm is
encouraged. 55 To illustrate, a corporate governance dispute took place
recently between Elliott Associates (hereinafter Elliott), a U.S. hedge fund,
and Samsung Group, a large Korean corporate group in which the globally
prestigious smart-phone and semi-conductor producer, Samsung
Electronics, is an affiliated company.56 Samsung Group proceeded with a
merger of Samsung C&T by Cheil Industries, a de facto holding company
of the group. Arguably, the main reason for the proposed merger was to
strengthen the control of the current controlling shareholder of the Lee
family, since Samsung C&T was a large shareholder of the group’s
flagship company, Samsung Electronics.57 After it purchased 7.12% of

52

See, e.g., Bernard Black et al., Shareholder Suits and Outside Director Liability: The
Case of Korea, 10 J. KOREAN L. 325, 344-45 (2010) (explaining the 1997 Korea First Bank
case, the first derivative suit in Korea).
53
See Hui Huang, The Statutory Derivative Action in China: Critical Analysis and
Recommendations for Reform, 4 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 227, 229 (2007) (providing a further
explanation of the derivative suit system in China); see also Hui Huang, Shareholder
Derivative Litigation in China: Empirical Findings and Comparative Analysis, 27 B.F.L.R.
619, 622 (2012), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract_id=2140613. See Sang Yop Kang,
Taking Voting Leverage and Anti-Director Rights More Seriously: A Critical Analysis of
the Law and Finance Theory, (Peking University School of Transnational Law Research
Paper No. 15-3, 2015) available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2669420 (providing a brief
comparison of derivative suit systems in the United States, China, and Korea).
54
See, e.g., Ling Zhou, The Independent Director System and Its Legal Transplant into
China, 6 J. COMP. L. 262, 263 (2011) (“The ‘independent director’ is a vivid example of
legal transplant into China’s post-Mao legal system.”).
55
See, e.g., Alon Brav et al., Hedge Fund Activism, Corporate Governance, and Firm
Performance, 63 J. FIN. 1729, 1729 (2008) (finding that “activist hedge funds in the United
States propose strategic, operational, and financial remedies and attain success or partial
success in two-thirds of the cases [from 2001 to 2006].”).
56
See Corporate Governance in South Korea: Reconstructing Samsung, THE ECONOMIST
(July 11, 2015), http://www.economist.com/news/business/21657377-bid-merge-twogroups-companies-raises-wider-questions-reconstructing-samsung (explaining the planned
mergers between Cheil Industries and Samsung C&T); see also Elliott Turns up Heat on
Samsung over Merger Bid, YONHOP NEWS (June 18, 2015, 18:55),
http://english.yonhapnews.co.kr/news/2015/06/18/0200000000AEN20150618001253320.h
tml.
57
See Simon Mundy, Samsung’s Founding Family Strengthens Grip on Group, THE
FINANCIAL TIMES (July 17, 2015, 9:15 AM), http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/0f7b9934-2c3f-
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Samsung C&T’s shares,58 Elliott became the third largest shareholder of
the company. Elliott contended that the proposed deal is “neither fair to
nor in the best interests of Samsung C&T’s shareholders.”59 In response
to this criticism, interestingly, Samsung Group also defended the deal
based on the shareholder primacy norm, arguing that the merger will
eventually create value for Samsung C&T shareholders due to the synergy
with Cheil Industries’ business portfolio.60
The issue of which party’s argument is more convincing—though
it is important and intriguing in the corporate governance scholarship—is
beyond the scope of this Article. 61 What I emphasize here is that
shareholder primacy and shareholder wealth maximization are standards
that the arguments of both Elliott and Samsung Group are grounded upon.
Indeed, in many countries outside the United States and the United
Kingdom, shareholder primacy and shareholder wealth maximization are
gradually accepted as the standard to measure the quality of corporate
governance.
B. (Quasi) Monopoly
Let us set aside the issues of shareholder wealth maximization for
a moment and consider (quasi) monopoly on a stand-alone basis. For the
sake of simplicity, take an example of a product market of a good.
According to microeconomics theory on producer behavior, a
corporation—if it is economically rational and attempts to maximize
profits—determines the level of output (hereinafter Qm), where the
marginal revenue (hereinafter MR)—namely, the increased revenue from
producing one more unit—is equal to the marginal cost (hereinafter MC)
namely, the increased cost of producing one more unit.62
1. Maximizing Monopoly Profits,
Deadweight Loss, and Social Welfare

Consumer

Surplus,

11e5-8613-e7aedbb7bdb7.html#axzz3rgQ1du00 (discussing “Samsung C&T’s 4 percent
stake in Samsung Electronics”).
58
Jungah Lee & Rose Kim, Activist Investor Elliott Starts ‘War’ on Samsung’s Lees,
BLOOMBERG (June 5, 2015, 10:44 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/201506-03/elliott-says-cheil-takeover-of-samsung-c-t-undervalues-company-iaherbxb.
59
Id. A rumor spread that Samsung prepared the proposed merger as a way of sacrificing
shareholder wealth, with the sole benefits going to the controlling family of the group. See
The ECONOMIST, supra note 56.
60
Id.
61
I am currently conducting further research on this issue in an independent project.
62
See PINDYCK & RUBINFELD, supra note 3, at 292-93; see also COOTER & ULEN, supra
note 3, at 27 (“the profit-maximizing output of the firm is shown at the point at which the
marginal cost curve, labeled MC, and marginal revenue curve of the firm are equal.”).
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This general principle of profit maximization (i.e., MR = MC) also
applies to a monopoly corporation, when it rationally tries to maximize
monopoly profits63 (see the following Figure 1). At the point where MR
equals MC, the monopolist determines the amount of monopoly-profitmaximizing output (Qm) and, based on a demand curve that consumers
face, charges the monopoly-profit-maximizing price (hereinafter Pm). 64
Pm is higher than the price determined in a competitive market
(hereinafter Pc). 65 For this reason, it is generally explained that a
monopolist has the price-setting capacity, while a supplier in a competitive
market is merely a price-taker.66 Qm is lower than the output level in a
competitive market (Qc):67 in response to a higher price in a monopoly,
consumers reduce their consumption.
Although the combination of Pm and Qm is optimal to the
monopolist, it lowers the level of consumer surplus. Wealth transfers
from the group of consumers to the monopolist (graphically, Rectangle A
indicates the transfer in Figure 1). There are fairness issues in regard to
this wealth transfer—though the issues are more like a socio-political
agenda. For instance, “if consumers on average are poorer than producers
(more precisely, than the owners of the producers),”68 such a transfer will
exacerbate the discrepancy between the poor and the wealthy.69 From an
efficiency standpoint, this type of wealth transfer is also problematic,
since DWL, a net loss in an economy, is created in the course of the
transfer. Specifically, DWL can be divided into two parts: (1) surplus that
consumers lose, since they reduce consumption at a higher monopoly
63

PINDYCK & RUBINFELD, supra note 3, at 367-68 (explaining the output decision of a
monopolist which tries to maximize profits).
64
See infra Figure 1.
65
PINDYCK & RUBINFELD, supra note 3, at 385 (“In a competitive market, price equals
marginal cost. Monopoly power, on the other hand, implies that price exceeds marginal
cost.”). Mathematically, Pc = MC and Pm > MC. Thus, Pm > Pc.
66
Id. at 288 (explaining that “firms in perfectly competitive markets are price takers”). But,
note that it does not mean that a monopolist can set any price. Id. at 366. A monopoly
company, if it tries to maximize profits, can set a price within the upper limit of Pm. It can
determine a price level, which is higher than Pm. In that case, however, the level of profits
will be lower than that at Pm, since the effect from a higher price would be outweighed by
the opposite effect from the reduced quantity that consumers would consume. See id.
Meanwhile, [Pm – Pc] / Pc) is referred to as the Lerner Index. ROGER D. BLAIR & DAVID L.
KASERMAN, ANTITRUST ECONOMICS 104 (2nd ed. 2009) (explaining the Lerner Index as
“[t]he most commonly used measure of monopoly power”). In other words, when the
difference between Pm and Pc, if it is divided by Pc, is large, a monopolist has strong
market power.
67
BLAIR & KASERMAN, supra note 66, at 37.
68
RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 285 (7th ed. 2007).
69
This phenomenon also lowers the level of society’s utility. Id. (“because of declining
marginal utility of income, a dollar is worth more to the average consumer than to the
average producer . . . even if there is no effect on output and therefore no deadweight
loss.”).
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price (Triangle B in Figure 1);70 and (2) surplus that the monopolist loses,
since at the higher monopoly price, the monopolist is not able to sell a
certain quantity of goods (Triangle C in Figure 1).71 As a result, the level
of social welfare—the total sum of consumer surplus and producer
surplus—in monopoly is lower than in a competitive market by DWL,
namely Triangle B plus Triangle C.72
FIGURE 1: GRAPH OF MONOPOLY

Pm

MC
A

B
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C

Demand Curve
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2. Other Considerations
A few points are worth noting further. First, certain patterns of
monopoly—such as a monopoly based on economies of scale (or scope),73
or a monopoly that enhances innovation—could be efficient. 74 For
instance, economies of scale can generate a natural monopoly, “a firm that
can produce the entire output of the market at a cost that is lower than
70

See PINDYCK & RUBINFELD, supra note 3, at 386.
Id.
72
Id.
73
See COOTER & ULEN, supra note 3, at 29 (“Economies of scale are a condition of
production in which the greater the level of output, the lower the average cost of
production.”) (emphasis in the original text).
74
See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
71
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what it would be if there were several firms.”75 “[A natural monopoly] is
more efficient to let it serve the entire market rather than have several
firms compete.”76 However, this Article does not focus on analyzing such
features. Second, oligopoly—when only a few producers exercise
dominant market power—would generate similar welfare problems (e.g.,
DWL), although the price-setting power of oligopolistic companies is less
than that of the monopolist.77 Table 1 summarizes the general contours of
monopoly, oligopoly, and a competitive market.
Third, oligopoly—if it is defined by a number of existing
competitors—is also the most common market structure in the United
States. It can be said, however, that the structure of U.S. oligopolies—for
example, the markets for automobiles or smart phones—are markedly
different from the structure of oligopolies in other countries. The entry
barriers of U.S. markets are low, so the U.S. product markets are quite
open to domestic and foreign companies. Accordingly, the extent of
competition—not only from existing producers, but also from potential
competitors ready to enter the U.S. markets—is high. Thus, in the United
States, the problem associated with exorbitant market power by a few
oligopoly corporations is less serious. For these reasons, the narrowly
defined oligopoly in this Article—where there are a few established
market players and those players exercise dominant market power without
worrying very much over potential competition 78—is more likely to be
found in less developed countries than in the United States.
Table 1: Price and Quantity of Industrial Organizations





Generally,
Pm > Po > Pc
Qm < Qo < Qc
Wm < Wo < Wc
Pm: price that maximizes monopoly profits
Qm: quantity that maximizes monopoly profits
Wm: social welfare under monopoly
Po: price charged in an oligopoly market

75

PINDYCK & RUBINFELD, supra note 3, at 388.
Id.
77
Under these circumstances, in general, an oligopoly price is higher than a competitive
market price, but is lower than a monopoly price. Also, in general, the level of output
available in oligopoly is higher than that in monopoly, but is lower than that in a
competitive market. An oligopoly price is not always higher than a competitive market
price, however, if producers in oligopoly face fierce price competition. However, this
Article focuses only on oligopoly where established companies exercise significant market
power. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
78
See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
76
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Qo: quantity produced in an oligopoly market
Wo: social welfare under oligopoly
Pc: price charged in a competitive market
Qc: quantity produced in a competitive market
Wc: social welfare under a competitive market
C. Tension Between (Quasi) Monopoly and Shareholder Wealth
Maximization
Recently, corporate law scholars, economists, policy-makers, and
judiciaries outside the United States have often emphasized legal reforms
based on arguments in line with shareholder primacy. When such
jurisdictions (particularly developing countries) import the AngloAmerican corporate governance ideology, an unconsidered potential risk
is that the shareholder wealth maximization norm may be incompatible
with the country’s underlying legal and market infrastructures.
In this light, Roe’s argument is of significance. In terms of social
efficiency, Roe pointed out that shareholder primacy would create
undesirable consequences.79 Since Roe compared the United States and
Europe, his argument can be understood in the following way: in the
United States where product markets were competitive, 80 shareholder
wealth maximization would be beneficial to the domestic economy, but in
Europe where product markets were less competitive, it is possible that
shareholder wealth maximization would not be beneficial to society. 81
Roe’s analysis can be further developed and applied to emerging countries,
where (quasi) monopoly is a dominant market structure. It is noteworthy,
however, that Roe pointed out a potentially negative effect of shareholder
primacy on welfare at the national level. Roe did not refute that
shareholder wealth maximization is beneficial to shareholders. In this
light, an argument of this Article—explained in Part IV—is novel and
intriguing: for Chinese SOEs that are wholly (or substantially) owned by
the government and that have (quasi) monopolistic power in domestic
markets, there is a high chance that the shareholder wealth maximization

79

See Roe, supra note 12, at 2063.
In general, even a market with a small number of competitors in the United States is
exposed to the high level of competition. See supra Part II.B.2.
81
See Roe, supra note 12, at 2063; see also supra note 12. In regard to Roe’s analysis, one
may argue that as the European market has been further integrated, it is probable that the
level of market competition in the United States and the Europe will be converged. The
European market is, however, not fully integrated as one unified economy like the United
States. The recent debate on possible exit of Greece and the United Kingdom from the
Eurozone or the European Union (“Grexit” and “Brexit”) is evidentiary.
80
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norm will bring negative impacts on the (ultimate) shareholders, not to
mention on national welfare.82
The recent case of Korea Electricity Power Corporation (KEPCO),
the monopoly supplier of electricity in Korea, provides a good example of
the conflict between the shareholder primacy norm and (quasi) monopoly
regulation. When determining a price, management of KEPCO discusses
it with the Korean government, which considers the price of electricity as
a factor of macro-economic policy in inflation and the general price level.
Conventionally, the price of electricity has been set at a low level.
Although KEPCO was discontent with the government’s low pricing
policy, the government’s guidelines on pricing generally prevailed. In
2011, a group of minority shareholders brought a derivative suit against
the then-CEO Ssang-Su Kim for damages of approximately 2.4 billion
dollars, accusing the management of KEPCO of abandoning shareholder
wealth by sticking to the government’s policy. 83 Eventually, the court
opined that such a business practice—after consultation with the
government, which was concerned about inflationary pressure—was
lawful.84 Although Mr. Kim won, according to reports, he personally had
to bear huge legal costs to defend this case.85 This story indicates that the
tension between monopoly (or oligopoly) regulation and the shareholder
primacy norm is not only a potential issue, but an issue that could be
realized in corporate litigation. This case gives similar implications to
China in the future, if shareholder primacy is aggressively accepted and a
derivative suit system is further developed.
D. Factors Uncovered by Roe

82

See infra Part IV.

83

See, e.g., Sejin Jeong (정세진), Toeim 1 ju namatda, Hanjeon Kim Ssang-Su sajang 2 jo

8000 eok sonbaeso danghaetda (퇴임 1 주 남았다, 한전 김쌍수 사장 2 조 8000 억
손배소 당했다) [One Week from Retirement, KEPCO CEO Ssang-Su Kim Sued for
Damages of 2.8 Trillion Won], DONG-A ILBO (Aug. 20, 2011, 03:00),
http://news.donga.com/3/all/20110820/39667624/1. KEPCO minority shareholders also
brought a related suit against the Korean government for its allegedly wrongful
intervention when determining the price of electricity, but the government won. See, e.g.,
Sang-Hoon

Jin

(진상훈),

Hanjeon

soaekjuju,

gookga

sangdae

7

jowondae

sonhaebaesangsosong paeso (한전 소액주주, 국가 상대 7 조원대 손해배상소송 패소)
[KEPCO Minority Shareholders Lost the 7 Trillion-Won Case Against the Government],
CHOSUN
BIZ
(Oct.
5,
2012,
11:23),
http://biz.chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2012/10/05/2012100501200.html.
84
See Jin, supra note 83.
85
It was expected that his legal expenses would be a few million dollars, which possibly
would not be covered by the corporation. See Jeong, supra note 83.
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Roe’s argument is insightful. Based on his seminal work,
however, there are many important and timely issues that could have been
explored further. For example, his analytical framework did not include
CMS, where a controlling shareholder holds a minority economic interest
in the controlled corporation.86 This seemingly odd ownership structure is,
however, used in many jurisdictions. Voting leverage devices—such as
stock pyramiding, dual-class equity structures, and cross shareholding—
make CMS available.87 Due to its peculiar feature of a disproportionate
relation between cash flow rights and voting rights, CMS—when it is
combined with (quasi) monopoly—potentially creates interesting
phenomena in the context of shareholder wealth maximization. Part III
explores the combined effects from CMS, a CMS controller’s incentive,
tunneling, (quasi) monopoly, and shareholder primacy.
Also, Roe’s original research on shareholder primacy did not
cover the Chinese economy. The dual-role of Chinese SOEs, as public
entities as well as corporations, is a critical topic in the analysis of the
tension between (quasi) monopoly and shareholder wealth maximization.
Part IV provides a series of novel and counter-intuitive explanations
regarding the situation in Chinese SOEs analyzing the impact of national
welfare, consumers, and shareholders.
CONTROLLING MINORITY STRUCTURE: (QUASI)
MONOPOLY, TUNNELING, AND SHAREHOLDER WEALTH
MAXIMIZATION
This Part explores CMS economies in the context of (quasi)
monopoly and shareholder primacy. Compared to the United States, the
industrial organization of CMS-based economies (particularly developing
countries) tends to be more monopolistic, with economic power
concentrated in large business entities.88 As discussed, an economically
rational monopoly “corporation” is assumed to make a decision in order to
maximize monopoly profits. 89 Note, however, that a corporation is a
fictional person created by law. 90 Although it is legally assumed that
business decisions are made by a “corporation” (monopolist in this
III.

86

CMS is one of the most significant factors in analyzing economies dominated by large
corporate groups.
87
See generally, Bebchuk et al., supra note 13.
88
The United States has long been considered a representative free market economy,
encouraging competition in society. See, e.g., Standard Oil Co v. FTC, 340 U.S. 231, 248
(1951) (“The heart of our national economic policy long has been faith in the value of
competition.”).
89
See PINDYCK & RUBINFELD, supra note 63 and accompanying text.
90
A similar issue, in different circumstances and for a different research question, was
raised in another article. See Kang, supra note 26, at 863-66 (analyzing Gilson’s riddles
and the product market-based account).
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Article), decision-makers are, in reality, corporate insiders such as a
controlling shareholder.91
A. Controlling Minority Structure and Shareholder Wealth
Maximization
A CMS controller, by definition, has minority ownership in a
corporation (e.g., 5%), while the controller wields a majority of voting
rights (e.g., 51%). As explained below, a CMS controller has a weak
incentive to choose the profit maximization point.
1. CMS Controller’s Low Level of Economic Interests
CSM-based business organizations are found in the United States
as well as in Asia and Europe. In 2014, in the four largest corporate
groups in Korea, controlling shareholders and their families held, on
average, 0.9% and 1.2% ownership respectively.92 In the same year, the
internal ownership—including controlling families’ indirect ownership
through affiliates as well as their direct ownership—of these corporate
groups accounted for 48.3%. 93 As a result, these families effectively
exercised control over corporate groups. The Wallenberg family in
Sweden is also famous for a huge discrepancy between their economic
interests (or cash flow rights) and voting rights: for example, “the
Wallenbergs have voting control over ABB [i.e., Sweden’s fourth largest
firm by market capitalization], but actually have a cash flow rights stake
of only about 5 percent.”94
In the United States, “[Mark] Zuckerberg owns 28.4 percent of
Facebook, the largest single stake in the company, and he extended his
voting power by implementing a dual-class stock structure in 2009.” 95
91

In the United States, decision-makers of a corporation are formally directors on the
board of directors. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (2014) (“The business and affairs of
every corporation organized under this chapter shall be managed by or under the direction
of a board of directors, except as may be otherwise provided in this chapter or in its
certificate of incorporation.”).
92
See Nansulhun Choi & Sang Yop Kang, Competition Law Meets Corporate
Governance: Ownership Structure, Voting Leverage, and Investor Protection of Large
Family Corporate Groups in Korea, 2 PEKING U. TRANSNAT’L L. REV. 411, 422 (2014)
(presenting data from the Korea Fair Trade Commission).
93
Id. The average internal ownership of the next six largest corporate groups accounted
for 59.2%. Id.
94
Randall Morck et al., Corporate Governance, Economic Entrenchment, and Growth, 43
J. ECON. LITERATURE 657, 665 (2005) (citing Rafael La Porta et al., Corporate Ownership
Around the World, 54 J. FIN. 471 (1999)).
95
Mark Zuckerberg: How Much Does He Make and What Does He Stand to Gain from
IPO?,
THE
WASHINGTON
POST
(Feb.
2,
2012),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/mark-zuckerberg-how-much-does-hemake-and-what-does-he-stand-to-gain-from-ipo/2012/02/02/gIQAhJBElQ_story.html.
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Due to voting leverage giving “[him] shares with 10 times more voting
power than common stock,” however, “[h]is command of the company
goes beyond stock—[Zuckerberg] controls 56.9 percent of the voting
power.”96
In China, Alibaba provides a good example of CMS. Before its
initial public offering (IPO) in 2014, the largest shareholder of Alibaba
was a Japanese corporation, Softbank, which owned 34.4%, followed by
Yahoo which owned 22.6%. 97 The ownership of Jack Ma was merely
8.9%. 98 Nonetheless, Alibaba’s controlling shareholder was Jack Ma.
Irrespective of economic interests, he used a partnership that had the
power to nominate a majority of the members of the board. 99 When
Alibaba planned to list in a stock exchange, the Hong Kong stock
exchange was a primary candidate. However, the Hong Kong stock
exchange would not allow Alibaba to use a control device that was
functionally equivalent to a one-share-multiple-vote mechanism. 100
Finally, Jack Ma and his partners chose to list Alibaba on the New York
Stock Exchange (NYSE) where voting leverage was permitted.101
Indeed, CMS is a useful ownership mechanism for controlling
shareholders since they can exercise control over corporations with only a
small fraction of their direct ownership. In this light, it is expected that
controlling family shareholders of large Chinese companies (or corporate
groups) will have a stronger incentive to rely on CMS and use voting
leverage devices such as stock pyramiding.

2. Renunciation of Monopoly Profit Maximization: Investors’
Loss and Consumers’ Benefit
96

Id.
See, e.g., Paul Hodgson, Alibaba IPO: Shareholders Can Buy Shares, Not Influence,
FORTUNE (Sept. 18, 2014, 10:45 AM), http://fortune.com/2014/09/18/alibaba-iposhareholders; see also Joseph Tsai: Alibaba’s Mega-Dealmaker, SHENZHEN DAILY (Sept.
19, 2014, 8:53 AM), http://www.szdaily.com/content/2014-09/19/content_10176909.htm.
98
See Hodgson, supra note 97; see also SHENZHEN DAILY, supra note 97. According to
recent reports, Jack Ma’s ownership was 7.6% (as of August 2015). See, e.g., Gillian
Wong, Alibaba’s Jack Ma, Joe Tsai to Borrow $2 Billion Against Shares, THE WALL
STREET JOURNAL (Sep. 4, 2015, 4:32 AM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/alibabas-jack-majoe-tsai-to-borrow-2-billion-against-shares-1441355553.
99
Alibaba Partnership, ALIBABA GROUP, http://www.alibabagroup.com/en/ir/
governance_9 (last visited Aug. 3, 2015) (explaining the Alibaba partnership’s “director
nomination right”).
100
See, e.g., Enda Curran, How Hong Kong Lost the Alibaba IPO, THE WALL STREET
JOURNAL (Mar. 15, 2014, 11:40 AM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB100014240
52702303546204579440820673013810.
101
See Nicole Bullock et al., Alibaba Closes at $93.89 in NYSE Debut, THE FINANCIAL
TIMES (Sept. 20, 2014,, 12:36 AM), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/8150f416-4002-11e4a381-00144feabdc0.html#slide0.
97
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Since a controlling shareholder’s ownership (or cash flow rights)
is small in a CMS, the controller’s personal economic interest is often not
aligned with the corporation. If a CMS controller owns only 5% of a
corporation, without tunneling, the controller is entitled to merely 5% of
the cash flow rights from dividends and market capital appreciation. 102
Consider such a case within the context of (quasi) monopoly. Although a
CMS controller’s economic interests are fractionally associated with the
corporation’s economic interests, monopoly profits are beneficial to a
CMS controller as well. In general, a decision to maximize monopoly
profits is optimal to a CMS controller. Due to the small percentage of
ownership, however, the CMS controller’s incentive to strictly follow the
profit maximization strategy for the corporation can be weakened if there
is an internal or external factor derailing an equilibrium of profit
maximization.
For instance, when a government drives monopoly regulations
such as a price stabilization policy, a CMS (quasi) monopoly
corporation—before it challenges the regulation in the media or the
judiciary—is likely to voluntarily give up its strategy of monopoly profit
maximization. In addition, if a CMS controller is able to gain other types
of large, personal benefits (either pecuniary or non-pecuniary), the
controller has more reason not to maximize profits for the corporation.103
Also, if a CMS controller has unique characteristics, personal philosophies
(e.g., a corporation as a means of philanthropy, as seen in Dodge)104 or
views, which are incompatible with the maximization of monopoly profits,
the controlling shareholder would not actively pursue profits for the other
shareholders.
Other things being equal, a CMS controller’s tendency to deviate
from monopoly profit maximization is further reinforced as a CMS
controller’s economic interests in a corporation decrease. In such a deep
CMS, a CMS controller is likely to charge a lower price than Pm (i.e., the
monopoly-profit maximizing price) and produce a larger quantity of a
good than Qm (i.e., the monopoly-profit maximizing quantity of a good

102

Basically, shareholders have two types of rights in a corporation, i.e., cash flow rights
and voting rights. Cash flow rights are not simply the right to receive dividends. Even if
dividends are not paid, shareholders can realize their cash flow rights through stock price
appreciation. In other words, cash flow rights are any pecuniary benefit that shareholders
are entitled to attain on a pro-rata basis. Of course, in a bad-law jurisdiction, controlling
shareholders expropriate from corporations (i.e., tunneling), taking more than their pro-rata
cash flows. As a result, in reality public shareholders are not able to enjoy some of their
cash flow rights.
103
Other benefits are either pecuniary or non-pecuniary benefits.
104
See supra Part II.A.1.
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produced to maximize monopoly profits). If so, public shareholders’
wealth in the corporation is not optimized.105
Clearly, from the perspective of corporate governance, this is a
minus factor. In theory, a CMS controller’s lackluster approach with
respect to shareholder primacy could amount to a breach of fiduciary duty,
detrimental to shareholders. In reality, however, in most cases, the
deferential business judgment rule protects the CMS controller (and
managers or directors).106 This is because it would be almost impossible
for public shareholders to rebut the presumption of reasonable business
judgment. Indeed, Dodge is an exceptional case, where a majority
shareholder is held liable for a corporation’s “undesirable” dividend policy,
which is generally considered to be within a board’s discretion. In Dodge,
a primary reason for the Court’s ruling against the corporation’s business
decision (i.e., a dividend payout policy) is that Henry Ford showed in a
bold manner—rather than disguised—his intention to put public welfare
(for consumers and employees) before shareholders’ economic interest.107
Other than a case of an explicit violation of the fiduciary duty to
105

Most managers in a widely-held corporation in the United States have less economic
interests in a corporation than a CMS controller. Then, a related question is: Do managers
in a U.S. dispersed-shareholder corporation follow the shareholder primacy norm? To my
knowledge, there is no convincing empirical evidence to answer this question. It is
plausible, however, that the shareholder wealth maximization principle works at least
better in the United States—although it does not work in a perfect manner—than in other
countries.
This is because the United States has many corporate governance
mechanisms—again, although they do not perfectly work—that rectify relatively well
managers’ attempt to deviate from the shareholder wealth maximization principle. These
corporate governance mechanisms include, but are not limited to, a business culture that
respects the shareholder primacy norm, stock option arrangements, the presence of
influential institutional investors, shareholder activism, competitive and sophisticated
capital and product markets, a developed disclosure system, relatively effective
independent directors, and the presence of relatively active markets for corporate control.
For instance, a stock option arrangement can possibly align the interest of top managers
with the interest of public shareholders. See, e.g., Roe, supra note 12, at 2075 (but also
explaining the obstacles of implementing stock options in Europe). On the other hand, for
a critical view of a typical stock option mechanism in the United States, see generally
Lucian A. Bebchuk & Jesse M. Fried, Pay Without Performance: Overview of the Issues,
30 J. CORP. L. 647 (2005) (critiquing existing executive pay arrangements and the
corporate governance processes that produce them). Also, given that the topic of this
Article is related to the tension among monopoly/oligopoly, shareholder wealth
maximization, and national welfare (with consumer surplus), one more aspect that should
be kept in mind is that monopolistic rents are less problematic in the United States, which
has perhaps the most competitive product markets in the world. See supra Part II.B.2.
106
See WILLIAM T. ALLEN ET AL., COMMENTARIES AND CASES ON THE LAW OF BUSINESS
ORGANIZATION 227-28 (4th ed. 2012) (“The core idea [of the business judgment rule] is
universal: Courts should not second-guess good-faith decisions made by independent and
disinterested directors.”).
107
See id. at 272 (“Dodge v. Ford Motor Co. is unique precisely because Mr. Ford
announced that he was acting in the interests of nonshareholders.”); see also supra Part
II.A.1.
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shareholders, there is little chance for a corporate insider to lose.
Accordingly, public shareholders would not be able to recover damages.
In addition, even if public investors recover damages in rare cases, they
are often subject to the so-called circularity problem in derivative suits: a
liable corporate insider is insured by director and officer insurance, for
which the corporation (and thus, eventually shareholders) pays.108
From the perspective of the efficiency of the entire nation,
however, a corporate insider’s aberration from the best interests of the
shareholders is a plus factor. For instance, the level of consumer surplus
will be enhanced relative to a case where maximizing monopoly profits is
pursued. Also, social welfare is improved, since the amount of DWL will
decrease. Consider both (quasi) monopoly and CMS on a stand-alone
basis: (quasi) monopoly is generally considered an undesirable form of
industrial organization due to the welfare loss. In addition, CMS is
generally considered a problematic ownership structure, due to a
controlling shareholder’s disproportionate decision-making power. When
these two negative aspects are combined—what I call the “square of a bad”
(or “Bad2”)—ironically, a positive outcome for national welfare may arise.
3. CMS Controller’s Collective Action Problem
In corporate governance scholarship, a theory of a collective
action problem is often used to explain a case where non-controlling
shareholders have difficulties when challenging corporate insiders in a
proxy fight.109 The key factor of the collective action problem is that—
from a viewpoint of a non-controlling shareholder who challenges in a
corporation’s election (and voting)—the costs of the challenge will be
concentrated on him or her while the benefits from the challenge will be
shared with other shareholders (i.e., free-riders). 110 In contrast to the
traditional collective action problem non-controlling shareholders face in
a proxy fight, this Subsection suggests another type of collective action
problem that a CMS controller faces in relation to profit maximization in
(quasi) monopoly.
(Quasi) monopolistic rents enlarged by shareholder wealth
maximization are problematic to consumers, government agencies, and the
108

See, e.g., Ehud Kamar, Shareholder Litigation Under Indeterminate Corporate Law, 66
U. CHI. L. REV. 887, 887-88 (1999) (“Arguably, there is no utility for shareholders in suing
corporate fiduciaries for damages when fiduciaries pay most of these damages using funds
provided by shareholders.”).
109
See, e.g., ALLEN ET AL., supra note 106, at 371 (explaining the concept of a collective
action problem in a context of corporation).
110
See, e.g., Bernard S. Black, Agents Watching Agents: The Promise of Institutional
Investor Voice, 39 UCLA L. REV. 811, 821 (1992) (“[A] shareholder proponent bears most
of the cost of a proxy campaign, but receives only a pro rata share of the gains from
success, while other shareholders can free ride on her efforts.”).
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general public. As the ultimate decision-maker of a corporation, it is
likely that a CMS controller who maximizes shareholder wealth would be
personally subject to criticism or even (official or unofficial) punishment.
If so, on the one hand, the costs—namely, criticism or (official or
unofficial) punishment arising from the monopoly profit maximization—
fall mostly on the CMS controller. On the other hand, the benefits from
maximizing profits in monopoly or oligopoly will be shared with noncontrolling public shareholders who hold the vast majority of the
economic interests in the corporation. Again, the CMS controller’s
fraction is small proportional to his or her ownership. Taking into account
the fact that the costs are concentrated but the benefits are dispersed, the
CMS controller’s incentive to maximize monopoly profits would be
weakened.
B. Deviation from Shareholder Wealth Maximization
Previously, Section A provided general explanations for the lack
of a CMS controller’s incentive to maximize monopoly profits. Now,
Section B explains, by introducing related accounts and examples, how a
CMS controller deviates from shareholder wealth maximization.
Specifically, Section B reviews a CMS controller’s preference of the size
of a corporation over profitability, and his or her personal philosophy,
which can potentially lower the profitability of a corporation. This
analysis also provides a useful foundation for predicting the behavior and
business decisions of controlling family shareholders in China. If
controlling family shareholders in China use CMS more frequently, it is
likely that they will pay less attention to shareholder primacy.
1. CMS Controller’s Size Preference
A CMS controller, depending on the cultural values of specific
jurisdictions, may be more interested in size maximization than in profit
maximization. This is partly because a CMS controller is able to enjoy
non-pecuniary benefits by running a large corporation. 111 Ruling a
corporation as a king is fun and exciting. Controlling shareholders tend to
expand corporate territory as much as possible, like Genghis Khan, raising
111

See Ronald J. Gilson, Controlling Shareholders and Corporate Governance:
Complicating the Comparative Taxonomy, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1641, 1664 (2006)
(“[C]ontrol of a large company in a small economy may provide a desirable social status
for the controlling family.”); see also George W. Dent, Jr., Unprofitable Mergers: Toward
a Market-Based Legal Response, 80 NW. U. L. REV. 777, 781 (1986) (“Corporate managers
may seek growth of firm size rather than maximization of share price in order to justify
better compensation and perquisites, to increase prestige, to expand opportunities for
promotion, and, perhaps most importantly, to protect themselves from the discipline of the
market.”); Kang, supra note 26, at 870-73 (explaining the concept of empire-building—i.e.,
increasing the size of a corporation—and non-pecuniary benefits).
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their self-esteem, even if some level of pecuniary benefits is sacrificed. In
Korea, the President sometimes has meetings with business leaders. In
these meetings, the physical distance between the President’s seat and the
business leaders’ generally depends on the asset size or sales of their
corporate groups (rather than profitability).112 Business elites perceive the
opportunity to talk and take a photo with the person in power as a
measurement of their success. In addition, the size of a business is, at
least sometimes, more significant than the level of profitability since a
corporation’s size provides negotiating and political power.
It is significant that while pecuniary benefits from (quasi)
monopoly profits accrue to a CMS controller on a pro-rata basis (e.g.,
5%), non-pecuniary benefits belong to him or her almost exclusively.113
Thus, the non-pecuniary benefits from managing a large business
enterprise as a corporate dictatorship are private benefits that only the
CMS controller, despite his or her fractional ownership, can enjoy.114 In
reality, CMS controllers do not choose solely on the basis of size
maximization or profit maximization. 115 Rather, they compromise
between these two poles. In any case, the pure profit maximization
strategy is not selected.
In addition, the large size of a corporation provides the
corporation with a variety of opportunities.
For instance, large
corporations, particularly in developing countries where capital markets
are not developed, have a comparative advantage in raising capital (either
equity or debt), entering into a new regulatory industry, and obtaining a

112

See, e.g., Yoon-Joo Lee (이윤주) et al., Gwonryeokja yeopjarineun ‘himui seoyeol’ . . .

Junkyungryun hoejangboda jaegye sunwiro (권력자 옆자리는 ‘힘의 서열’ . . . 전경련
회장보다 재계 순위로) [Seat Next to President Chosen by ‘Ranks of Power’ . . . Given to
Person with Biggest Market Capitalization Not President of Federation of Korean
Industries], THE KYUNGHYANG SHINMUN (May 19, 2014, 9:22 PM),
http://bizn.khan.co.kr/khan_art_view.html?artid=201405191520161&code=920509&med=
khan (explaining that the power of business entities, including banks, is generally
measured by their asset size).
113
See, e.g., Kang, supra note 26, at 876 (describing a controlling shareholder as the
beneficiary of non-pecuniary benefits).
114
Id. In the example of “sitting next to the President,” it can be said that public
shareholders indirectly benefit from a controlling shareholder’s attempt to enlarge the size
of a business entity. This is because media attention brought to a large business entity
could strengthen confidence for the business in both a product market and a capital market.
115
Under the size maximization case, it is known that the quantity of a good is determined
where the total revenue (TR) is equal to the total cost (TC). Compare with the profit
maximization case, where the quantity of a good is determined where the marginal revenue
(MR) is equal to the marginal cost (MC).
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“survival insurance” because they are “too-large-to-fail.” 116 If these
benefits go directly to corporations rather than controlling shareholders,
benefits are shared with—though not necessarily on a pro-rata basis—
public shareholders.
When a CMS controller pays attention to the size of the
corporation and deviates from the pure shareholder wealth maximization
norm, the controller decides to increase the quantity of a good produced
by a monopoly corporation from Qm towards Qc 117 (thus, the final
quantity would be Qs which is situated between Qm and Qc). The
economic interests of public shareholders will be damaged because the
monopoly profits raised by market power will shrink. 118 On the other
hand, for the same reason, the amount of consumer surplus will be
enlarged. The overall level of welfare for a domestic economy would be
enhanced as DWL diminishes.119 As discussed in the “square of a bad”
(or “Bad2”), 120 a CMS with (quasi) monopoly might generate a better
consequence—the combination of a high level of output and low price—
for consumers and society.121
Of course, it does not say that the “square of a bad” is optimal in
absolute terms. Given the (quasi) monopoly, for instance, the quality of a
good or service will not be improved due to the lack of meaningful
competition in a market. X-inefficiency122 and other problems associated
with CMS and monopoly (e.g., business-politics collusion) also should be
recognized. 123 In particular, corporate insiders’ shirking usually takes
place in a (quasi) monopoly. In this respect, the positive aspect of the
“square of a bad” merely indicates that the situation is “better than we had
thought” in relative terms. This limited interpretation of the “square of a
bad” is useful to examine the current and future markets in China.
2. Controlling Shareholder’s Personal Philosophy
A business tycoon’s personal philosophy may also negatively
affect shareholder wealth maximization. As discussed previously, 124
116

Many scholars analyze the phenomenon of “too-large-to-fail” in a context of financial
institutions and corporations. See, e.g., Kang, supra note 26 at 880-81 (explaining toolarge-to-fail as a form of insurance).
117
As explained earlier, Qm stands for the quantity produced by a monopoly corporation
when it follows monopoly profits maximization. Qc stands for the quantity produced in a
competitive market.
118
It is also useful to analyze this phenomenon based on supra Figure 1.
119
See id.
120
See supra Part III.A.2 (explaining the “square of a bad” (or “Bad 2”)).
121
Note that this explanation is based on “no-tunneling.” As to a further analysis with
tunneling, see infra Part III.C.
122
See infra note 156 and accompanying text.
123
See infra Part III.D.
124
See supra Part II.A.1 (explaining Dodge).
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Henry Ford’s philosophy of philanthropy for employees, consumers, and
society is exemplary. 125 Almost a century later, intriguingly, Alibaba’s
Jack Ma introduced a unique business philosophy similar to Henry
Ford’s.126 In a letter to employees before the company’s IPO, Jack Ma
confirmed that Alibaba believed in the principle of “customer first,
employee second, shareholder third”:127
In a few minutes we will officially submit our initial
registration statement to the U.S. Securities and Exchange
Commission. This means Alibaba is about to enter a new
era of challenges . . . After we go public, we would
continue to adhere to the principle of “customer first,
employee second, shareholder third.” We believe that, no
matter what difficult decisions we face whether now or in
the future, sticking with our principles is the best way to
respect and protect the interests of all parties.128 (emphasis
added).
A few additional points about this letter are worth noting. Most of
all, this letter explicitly shows Jack Ma’s belief in “customer primacy,” as
opposed to “shareholder primacy.” 129 No matter whether “customers”
refer to sellers or purchasers of the Alibaba platform, the letter may
convey that Alibaba would give up maximizing profits belonging to
shareholders.130 Since Jack Ma’s economic interest in Alibaba is less than
125
Note, however, that Henry Ford’s decision not to pay a sufficient level of dividends to
shareholders (particularly the Dodge brothers) can be also explained by his business
strategy rather than his philanthropy. See ALLEN ET AL, supra note 106, at 271 (“In 1913,
the Dodge brothers announced that they would stop building cars for Ford, and would
design, build, and sell their own car . . . In 1916, Ford announced that his company would
stop paying dividends, in an attempt to cut off the cash flow that fueled his rivals’
business.”).
126
Currently, I am considering an independent project in relation to Alibaba and investor
protection. This Section’s explanation of Alibaba is from the initial research for this
project.
127
See, e.g., ‘Unparalleled Ruthlessness’ Awaits: Jack Ma’s Letter to Alibaba Employees, THE WALL
STREET JOURNAL (May 7, 2014, 12:13 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/chinarealtime/2014/05/07/unparalleledruthlessness-awaits-jack-mas-letter-to-alibaba-employees/ (introducing Jack Ma’s e-mail to
Alibaba’s employees).
128
See id (quoting Jack Ma’s e-mail to Alibaba’s employees).
129
Alternatively, it is possible that the principle of “customer first, employee second,
shareholder third” is merely Alibaba’s (or Jack Ma’s) general business slogan. If so, the
principle does not necessarily hurt the interest of shareholders in Alibaba, since it can be
construed that the principle is merely a marketing phrase to attract customers.
130
Since Alibaba is the largest e-commerce company in China, it is generally explained
that Alibaba is a (quasi) monopolist with significant market power. As to the Alibaba’s
market share in China, see Adam Jourdan, Surviving Chairman Ma: Life in the Shadow of
China’s Alibaba, REUTERS (Nov. 26, 2013, 4:20 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/uschina-ecommerce-idUSBRE9AP17H20131126 (“Alibaba accounts for half of online retail
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10%,131 he bears a small percentage of the lost monopoly profits. This
opportunity cost is the price for realizing his personal belief. I do not
downplay Jack Ma’s sincere desire for philanthropy. However, given his
net-worth of 24.5 billion dollars,132 keeping faith in his business may be
more valuable to him than additional pecuniary benefits. It is possible that
the “marginal utility”133 of pecuniary benefits—the additional satisfaction
of an additional dollar—is tiny, or even close to zero at his level of wealth.
Sometimes, corporate insiders maintain a business line closely
related to their hobbies as a “pet project.” This type of externalization is
detrimental both to shareholders and society. Compared to spending
resources for a “pet project,” complying with a personal belief for
“customer primacy” in Alibaba could be more desirable. Nonetheless,
more than 90% of the opportunity cost, in relation to the renunciation of
maximized monopoly profits, will be borne by shareholders other than
Jack Ma. In this light, it is theoretically possible that public shareholders
may bring a suit since shareholder wealth is a subordinate ideology to the
welfare of customers and employees in Alibaba (the argument of
shareholders would be based on Dodge to some extent).134

sales through its Tmall online market while its eBay like Taobao also controls around 80
percent of consumer to consumer online sales, according to data from consultancy
Euromonitor . . . By comparison, China’s second largest ecommerce firm Jingdong, or
JD.com, has a nearly 13 percent market share.”); Kathy Chu & Gillian Wong, Alibaba vs.
JD.com: Executives Weigh In, THE WALL STREET JOURNAL (Aug. 17, 2015, 2:45 AM),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/alibaba-vs-jd-com-executives-weigh-in-1439793927
(“Alibaba Group Holding Ltd. remains the giant, capturing nearly 59% of China’s fastgrowing business-to-consumer marketplace . . . JD.com’s share was 23% in the first
quarter of 2015 . . . .”). On the other hand, it might also be explained that Alibaba is not a
firmly established (quasi) monopolist due to the competitive features of e-commerce (e.g.,
competition with Jingdong). If so, Alibaba’s “customer first” policy can be explained by
the potential competition in the market, as well as by Jack Ma’s personal philosophy for
customers (and society).
131
See supra note 98 and accompanying text (explaining that Jack Ma’s ownership before
the IPO was 8.9% and his recent ownership as of August 2015 was 7.6%).
132
See, e.g., Paul Carsten, Alibaba’s Jack Ma Dethroned as China’s Richest by Solar
Magnate:
Report,
REUTERS
(Feb.
3,
2015,
5:27
AM),
http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/02/03/us-china-wealth-idUSKBN0L70WA20150203
(stating that Jack Ma and his family’s personal wealth is $24.5 billion).
133
Marginal utility is “the additional satisfaction or benefit (utility) that a consumer derives
from buying an additional unit of a commodity or service.” See BRITANNICA,
http://global.britannica.com/topic/marginal-utility (last visited Aug. 6, 2015). It is known
that marginal utility diminishes. See KRUGMAN & WELLS, supra note 6, at 252 (“each
successive clam adds less to total utility than the previous clam.”).
134
Alibaba may argue that its customer-friendly policy will be, in the long run, beneficial
to shareholders. See also supra note 129. In practice, however, it would be difficult for
public shareholders in the United States to bring suit against corporate insiders of Alibaba.
It is partially because Alibaba is incorporated in Cayman Islands. Presentation of
Professor Jesse Fried at Harvard Law School (Seminar at Peking University Law School,
Nov. 2, 2015).
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C. Tunneling and (Quasi) Monopoly Profits
So far, Part III has explored a CMS controller’s incentive issues
without considering tunneling. Section C examines the impacts of
tunneling on shareholder wealth maximization and on the welfare of
shareholders, consumers, and the nation in a (quasi) monopoly
environment. In this analysis, three suboptimal aspects are combined: (1)
bad industrial organization (i.e., monopoly); (2) bad ownership structure
(i.e., CMS); and (3) bad corporate law (i.e., tunneling). I call this
combination the “cube of a bad” (or “Bad3”). The “cube of a bad” has
implications for controlling family shareholders of large corporate groups,
particularly in China where the quality of corporate governance is poor
(and thus tunneling is not effectively kept in check).
In regard to the extent of tunneling, three scenarios are considered
in the following Subsections: (1) Tunneling of Substantially All of
Corporate Assets (e.g., tunneling of an additional 85%); (2) Small-Scale
Tunneling (e.g., tunneling of an additional 3%); and (3) Significant Levels
(But Not Substantially All) of Tunneling (e.g., tunneling of an additional
25%). In these scenarios, a hypothetical CMS controller holds a 5%
economic interest in a corporation. Since numerical examples of the level
of tunneling (85%, 3%, and 25%) are selected merely for simplicity
purposes, a more generalized model can be further developed and
suggested.135
1. Tunneling of Substantially All of Corporate Assets (e.g.,
Tunneling of an Additional 85%)
Suppose that a CMS controller, holding a 5% of economic interest
in a corporation, is able to expropriate 85% of corporate value in addition
to justified 5% cash flows. Such drastic plundering may take place in a
severely tainted bad-law jurisdiction, either because corporate law in itself
is imperfect or because the enforcement system—although the law-on-thebook is perfect—is ineffective. 136 Under these circumstances, the
controller’s personal economic incentive—due to the combined effect of
legitimate and unjustified cash flow rights—aligns almost exactly with

135

See infra Part III.D.
See, e.g., Ronal J. Gilson, Controlling Family Shareholders in Developing Countries:
Anchoring Relational Exchange, 60 STAN. L. REV. 633, 634 (2007) (“The law and finance
literature, exemplified by a series of articles by Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-deSilanes, Andrei Shleifer, Robert Vishny and others, treats the prevalence of controlling
shareholders as the result of bad law.”). However, Gilson explains that some controlling
shareholder regimes are good-law countries. Gilson, supra note 111, at 1645 (explaining
that Sweden—a controlling shareholder regime—is a good-law country).
136
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that of the corporation since the controller takes 90% of corporate value.137
Accordingly, it is highly likely that the controller will pursue monopoly
profit maximization. A caveat from the CMS controller’s standpoint,
however, is that in the next stage, public shareholders of the pillaged
corporation would be highly reluctant to invest further and, thus, will
leave the corporation. For that reason, a CMS controller’s extensive
tunneling is likely a one-time event. A CMS controller, who wishes to
remain as a repeat player, such as a controlling family shareholder who
intends to stay in a corporation for a long time via inheritance, would not
depend on massive tunneling.138
Nevertheless, if massive tunneling occurs, the result will be the
worst from both the aspects of shareholder primacy and social welfare:
(1) the financial interests of public investors will be severely damaged; (2)
due to public shareholders’ distrust in their investment in corporations,
further development in a capital market is unlikely; (3) a large amount of
consumer surplus will be transferred to a monopoly corporation, where the
CMS controller takes 90% of economic interests; and (4) a gigantic
amount of DWL would be created.
2. Small-Scale Tunneling (e.g., Tunneling of an Additional 3%)
Suppose that a CMS controller with 5% ownership in a monopoly
corporation relies on a strategy of small-scale tunneling and takes an
additional 3% of corporate value on top of the justified 5% cash flows.
This scenario of modest tunneling by a controlling shareholder is a more
realistic repeated-game arrangement in a bad-law jurisdiction if public
investors and a controlling shareholder have a long time horizon. 139
Perhaps a controlling shareholder would like to rely on substantial
plundering; however, the controller might believe that substantial
plundering is too risky in terms of legal repercussions and enforcement.
Although the 3% level looks low in this scenario,140 the CMS controller’s
137

In this hypothetical example, a CMS controller’s legitimate cash flow rights are 5%,
while unjustified cash flow rights are 85%. Thus, the total cash flows are 90%.
138
Thus, this scenario of massive tunneling is ruled out in a jurisdiction based on
controlling family shareholders with corporate groups, except for a slim chance that public
shareholders are still satisfied with the remaining profits. Although it is a remote
possibility, theoretically, it is possible that public shareholders with 95% cash flow rights
are satisfied (though not perfectly satisfied) with 10% of actual cash flows. In that case,
they would remain in a corporation as public shareholders.
139
This type of controlling shareholder is referred to as a “stationary controller” who
periodically extracts a part of corporate value. The other type of controlling shareholder is
a “roving controller” who plunders the entire corporate value at once. See generally Kang,
supra note 28 (explaining a “stationary controller” and a “roving controller”).
140
Note that I do not have in mind any specific controlling family shareholder who relies
on 3% tunneling. It is extremely difficult to understand the extent of tunneling, which
usually takes place in secret. 3% is merely a numerical example in this hypothetical case.
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“extra return” (i.e., 3% tunneling) on the “initial investment” (i.e., 5%
cash flow rights) is huge (60%).141 The CMS controller with small-scale
tunneling has still a weak incentive to pursue monopoly profit
maximization, since the controller’s total cash flows are merely 8%.142 It
is noteworthy, however, that a CMS controller with small-scale tunneling
has a stronger incentive for profit maximization than a CMS controller
without tunneling, whose justified cash flow rights account for 5% in a
corporation. To some extent, shareholder wealth maximization, ironically,
can be supported by tunneling.
An interesting and contradictory phenomenon emerges in the
context of shareholder protection when a CMS controller relies on
tunneling. On the one hand, public shareholders are less protected, since a
controller takes the public shareholders’ wealth reserved in a corporation.
On the other hand, public shareholders may gain more economic benefits,
due to the controller’s relatively stronger incentive to maximize monopoly
profits.143 Thus, modest tunneling has a mixed impact on shareholders.
Subsequently, consider the impact of the modest tunneling on social
welfare relative to a situation with no tunneling. Tunneling, even if it is
modest, strengthens a CMS controller’s incentive to follow monopoly
profit maximization. Thus, the CMS controller will move up price
towards Pm. As a result, consumers will be worse off and the DWL will
be larger. This will lower the level of national welfare.
Examine tunneling in China. Some controlling shareholders
expropriate substantially all of corporate assets. For example, “[in 2001],
the largest shareholder of Sanjiu Pharmacy extracted $301.9 million or
96% of this listed company’s total equity.”144 As time goes by, corporate
governance systems in China will stabilize and more controlling family
shareholders, who intend to stay in their controlled corporations for a long
time, will emerge as repeat players. 145 Then, although it is difficult to
entirely rule out tunneling of substantially all corporate assets, a modest
level of extraction will be dominant in the future. If so, this Subsection
will provide a useful framework to analyze the interaction of (quasi)
monopoly, CMS, and modest tunneling in China.
141

3% ÷ 5% = 0.6 (which is equivalent to 60% return-on-equity). Accordingly, this
situation is also attractive to the CMS controller.
142
In this hypothetical example, a CMS controller’s original cash flow rights are 5%, while
unjustified cash flow rights are 3%. Thus, the total cash flows are 8%.
143
It is noteworthy, however, that a CMS controller in this example has only 3% more
economic incentives. Accordingly, his or her incentive to follow shareholder primacy will
be slightly strengthened. As a result, benefits for public shareholders could be limited.
Ultimately, how much public shareholders indirectly benefit from a controller’s tunneling
is an empirical question.
144
See Chong-En Bai et al., Corporate Governance and Market Valuation in China, 32 J.
COMP. ECON. 599, 600 (2004).
145
See generally Kang, supra note 28 (explaining a stationary controller as a repeat player).
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3. Significant Levels of Tunneling (e.g., Tunneling of an
Additional 25%)
If a CMS controller with 5% ownership of a monopoly
corporation takes a significant amount, but not substantially all, of
corporate value (e.g., taking 25% of corporate value beyond the justified
5% of cash flows), the controller has more incentive to pursue monopoly
profit maximization than a controller with tunneling of 3%. As a result,
price would increase further towards Pm and quantity would decrease
towards Qm. Again, the effect on shareholder protection is not
straightforward. On the one hand, the size of tunneling is significant and
harms public shareholders. On the other hand, when the CMS controller
arduously pursues monopoly profits, public shareholders are likely to
receive—at the expense of consumers—a significant portion of these
profits, albeit on less than a pro-rata basis.146
In light of this, it is difficult to label the public shareholders in a
bad-law jurisdiction—though their cash flow rights are taken by a
controlling shareholder—as “unilateral victims” due to the wealth transfer
from consumers to all of the shareholders (public shareholders as well as a
controller).147 If monopoly rents are generated due to an unduly high price
charged by a monopoly corporation, it can be said that consumers are
exploited by the corporation.
Public investors in the monopoly
corporation benefit from the wealth transfer even if they do not actively
In different terms, public
participate in such “exploitation.” 148
shareholders are on the same ship with the main exploiter—the monopoly
corporation (or its controlling shareholder). This analysis can also apply
to controlling family shareholders in China if they use CMS in corporate
groups and rely on significant (but not substantially all) level of tunneling,
given (quasi) monopoly.
One may point out that public shareholders obtain only 70% of
monopoly profits while they are entitled to 95% of cash flow rights in a
corporation.149 The logic may continue that public shareholders lose 25%
of economic benefits 150 and, thus, they are still victims. However, if
monopoly profits are “rents” in favor of the entire shareholder group (i.e.,
both a controller and public shareholders) to the detriment of consumers, it
146

Note that in this case, public shareholders own 95% of economic interests in the
corporation. Also, note that in this case, public shareholders end up with 70% of
monopoly profits, since 25% of profits are taken by a controller’s tunneling (i.e., 95% –
25% = 70%).
147
See Kang, supra note 26, at 894.
148
Sometimes, however, it is likely that public shareholders, as investors of a monopoly
corporation, demand actively to charge the price (Pm) that maximizes monopoly profits.
149
See supra note 146.
150
95% − 70% = 25%.
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can be said that public shareholders benefit 70% more, rather than lose
25%. In addition, whether it is 95:5 or 70:30 between public shareholders
and a controller, the internal allocation of exploited resources within an
exploiting entity does not matter from the standpoint of the consumers
who are the ultimate victims in this case.151 Accordingly, consumers may
feel that public shareholders—who may claim that they suffer from a
controller’s tunneling—are merely weaker exploiters who capture rents
that consumers could have benefitted from.
4. Comparison of All Scenarios
In Scenario 3 (tunneling of 25%), the controller has a greater
incentive to maximize monopoly profits than a CMS controller in
Scenario 2 (tunneling of 3%), but less incentive than a CMS controller in
Scenario 1 (tunneling of 85%). Thus, the monopoly price charged in
Scenario 3 is likely to be in between the price in Scenario 1 (highest) and
that in Scenario 2 (lowest). However, recall that the price in Scenario 2 is
likely to be higher than in the case where no tunneling takes place at all.
Due to a CMS controller’s sufficient incentive to approach Pm and Qm in
Scenario 3, the social welfare is damaged through a large amount of
DWL: DWL in Scenario 3 is larger than in Scenario 2, but smaller than in
Scenario 1. Table 2 summarizes the three scenarios discussed in this
Section.
Table 2: Extent of Tunneling, Monopoly Profit Maximization, DWL, and
Social Welfare

SCENARIO 1
(TUNNELING
OF 85%)

SCENARIO 2
(TUNNELING
OF 3%)

SCENARIO 3
(TUNNELING
OF 25%)

CMS
Controller’s
Incentive to
Maximize
Monopoly Profits

Strong

Weak

Semi-Strong

Price

High

Low

In-between

Quantity
DWL

151

Small Amount Large Amount
Large

Small

In-between
In-between

Monopoly rents will be distributed by the ratio of 95:5 (public shareholders v. a CMS
controlling), if tunneling does not take place at all. However, rents will be distributed by
the ratio of 70:30 if tunneling of 25% applies.
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Worst
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In-between

D. Summary and Other Considerations
Consider a simple, general model based on variables rather than
specific numerical examples.
In this model, a CMS controlling
shareholder’s cash flow rights (i.e., economic interests in a corporation)
and the level of tunneling are denoted as “α” and “β,” respectively. For
example, when a CMS controller holding a 5% economic interest in a
corporation does not rely on tunneling at all, α is 5% and β is 0%. When
the CMS controller takes an additional 25% of corporate value, α is 5%
and β is 25%.152 A CMS controller’s total cash flows in a corporation,
including tunneling, are calculated as “α plus β.” Based on this general
model, the analysis of Part III can be summarized by two cases: the “case
without tunneling” (i.e., β = 0, and thus the situation of good-law) and the
“case with tunneling” (i.e., β > 0, and thus the situation of bad-law).
First, consider the “case without tunneling.” Since the value of β
is zero, only the value of α matters. Given (quasi) monopoly of a certain
jurisdiction, as an average controller’s cash flow rights decrease (i.e., as
the value of α becomes smaller), four outcomes are likely. (1) The profit
maximization norm is less likely to be pursued, since controllers with a
smaller α (particularly deep CMS controllers) have a weaker incentive to
maximize profits. (2) Accordingly, public minority shareholders are likely
to be worse off. (3) It is likely, however, that DWL will be reduced, since
corporations move away from monopoly-profit maximizing price and
quantity. As a result, social welfare will be improved. (4) Also, the
welfare of consumers will be enhanced, since controlling shareholders
with a low level of economic interests have lukewarm incentive to
maximize monopoly profits.
Due to monopoly (i.e., bad industrial organization) and deep CMS
(i.e., bad ownership structure), the case without tunneling is referred to as
the “square of a bad” (or “Bad2”).153 Outcomes (1) and (2), which are
related to investor protection, are easily understandable. In contrast,
outcomes (3) and (4), which are associated with efficiency and social
welfare, are counter-intuitive to some extent. This is because “positive”
outcomes—the welfare of consumers and the nation as a whole is
enhanced—arise, when two “negatives” are combined. Sections A and B
in this Part are basically explained based on the case without tunneling.
Subsequently, examine the “case with tunneling” where the value
of β is not zero. Given monopoly in a jurisdiction, as an average CMS
controller’s tunneling becomes more serious (as the value of β becomes
larger), another four outcomes are likely. (1) The profit maximization
152
153

See supra Part III.C.3.
See supra Part III.A.2.
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norm is more likely to be pursued, since the alignment of economic
interests between CMS controllers and monopoly corporations is
reinforced. 154 (2) The welfare of public shareholders is affected in a
mixed manner. On the one hand, due to more serious tunneling (as the
value of β becomes larger), public shareholders are likely to be worse off.
On the other hand, the larger value of β provides CMS controllers with
stronger incentive to pursue monopoly profit maximization, which ends up
yielding more benefits to all of the shareholders. (3) DWL is likely to be
larger, since the corporation is going to move towards the monopoly-profit
maximizing price and quantity. Accordingly, national welfare would be
harmed.155 (4) In addition, the level of consumer surplus would worsen, as
the price close to Pm is chosen and wealth transfers from consumers to the
monopoly corporation.
Due to monopoly (i.e., bad industrial organization), deep CMS
(i.e., bad ownership structure), and tunneling (i.e., bad corporate
governance), the case with tunneling is referred to as “cube of a bad” (or
“Bad3”). In this case, outcomes (1) and (2) are, to some extent, counterintuitive. In (1), interestingly, tunneling—despite its negative connotation
in terms of investor protection—reinforces a CMS controller’s incentive to
follow profit maximization, which is beneficial to public shareholders. As
a result, in (2) the damage caused by tunneling to public shareholders will
be mitigated by enhanced shareholder wealth maximization.
In sum, when CMS is combined with (quasi) monopoly and/or
tunneling, positive outcomes may inadvertently arise. Nonetheless, it is
worth noting that this Article does not disagree with the classic, critical
views of (quasi) monopoly, CMS, and tunneling. Indeed, (quasi)
monopolies generate many problems. For instance, a corporation in a
(quasi) monopoly market does not have to improve corporate efficiency
due to the lack of competition. Thus, a monopoly corporation’s internal
inefficiency, such as “X-inefficiency,” may arise.156 In addition, when an
active market for corporate control 157 does not exist—which is true in
many jurisdictions—it is extremely difficult to rectify corporate insiders’
slack in a monopoly corporation. In other words, this type of monopolist
is subject to virtually no external pressure from M&A and product markets.
Also, CMS generally creates bad outcomes in corporate governance.
154

See, e.g., supra Table 2 and accompanying text.
See id.
156
See Oliver D. Hart, The Market Mechanism as an Incentive Scheme, 14 BELL J. ECON.
366, 366 (1983) (stating that given the lack of competition, X-inefficiency is measured by
“the amount of slack in the system due to individuals’ not minimizing costs or being on
their production possibility frontiers”).
157
See, e.g., Bernard S. Black, The Legal and Institutional Preconditions for Strong
Securities Markets, 48 UCLA L. REV. 781, 842 (2001) (“[A]n active market for corporate
control . . . can indirectly monitor performance and partly substitute for weaker direct
shareholder oversight.”).
155
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Particularly, when CMS is associated with tunneling, it has a huge
negative effect on investor protection. Moreover, it is problematic that
CMS controllers—usually, a small number of business tycoons in a
jurisdiction—are likely to have political connections with a government;
they and their business associations often seek economic rents in an unfair
manner.158
These problems, however, are well known and already studied
closely by economists, corporate law scholars, practitioners, and policymakers. Thus, this Article, concurring with such general opinions, does
not redundantly explain the same points. Rather, this Article focuses on
novel findings and analyses. It is also noteworthy that this Article
provides an analytical framework for CMS and/or tunneling, given that
(quasi) monopoly is firmly established in a certain jurisdiction and, at least
in the short or medium term, it is impractical to reform the jurisdiction’s
imperfect industrial organization. Under these circumstances, shareholder
wealth maximization may result in unintended outcomes.
IV.
STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISES IN CHINA: (QUASI)
MONOPOLY AND SHAREHOLDER WEALTH MAXIMIZATION
Regarding the tension between shareholder maximization and
(quasi) monopoly, Part III explored two factors—CMS and tunneling—
that Roe did not emphasize in his research. Subsequently, Part IV
theoretically examines the possible tension in the context of Chinese
SOEs, another factor that Roe’s research does not cover. Two points are
worth noting in relation to the following analysis in Part IV. First, the
analysis focuses specifically on SOEs which are (quasi) monopolies in
domestic markets.159 Second, although the theoretical approach in Part IV
might also apply to similarly situated SOEs in other countries, China is
perhaps the most important example of the analysis. This is because
China is, formally speaking, the largest communist economy—although it

158

It is generally explained that chaebols (large family corporate groups) in Korea and
privately owned corporations in China have close connections with the government. See
Ronald J. Gilson & Curtis J. Milhaupt, Economically Benevolent Dictators: Lessons for
Developing Democracies, 59 AM. J. COMP. L. 227, 246 (2011) (“Chaebol structures still
reflect their origins in the growth alliance with the [Chung-Hee] Park regime [in Korea].”);
Curtis J. Milhaupt & Wentong Zheng, Beyond Ownership: State Capitalism and the
Chinese Firm, 103 GEO. L.J. 665, 669 (2015) (“[L]arge firms in China—whether [stateowned enterprises], [privately owned enterprises], or ambiguous state-private blends—
survive and prosper precisely because they have fostered connections to state power and
have succeeded in obtaining state-generated rents.”).
159
In other words, Part IV does not cover Chinese SOEs, which do their main businesses in
foreign markets. Accordingly, consumers of SOEs in Part IV are generally the citizens of
China. In addition, Part IV analyzes mainly SOEs where the government holds a high
percentage of ownership.

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/alr/vol11/iss1/4

166

U. OF PENNSYLVANIA ASIAN LAW REVIEW Vol. 11

adopts many pragmatic market-oriented policies—and SOEs are main
business entities in most sectors.
Recently, the significance of Chinese SOEs in the world economy
has been evident. “More than half of the Chinese companies in the 2012
Fortune Global 500 are SOEs supervised by an organ of the central
government.”160 In many Chinese domestic markets, SOEs play as (quasi)
monopolists with strong market power.161 In this respect, it is crucial to
analyze which effects are expected if SOEs in domestic markets pursue
the shareholder wealth maximization norm widely supported by
economists, legal scholars, practitioners, and policy-makers in developed
economies.
By definition, the government is a controlling shareholder of
SOEs.162 It is noteworthy, however, that the Chinese government is the
“agent” of the citizens of China. 163 In other words, the Chinese
government resembles Janus, with two-faces, one as the principal of SOEs
and the other as the agent of the Chinese people. In principle, the citizens
of China as a group are the “real principal” and the “ultimate
shareholders”164 of SOEs. Similar analysis can be applied in a context of
Chinese SOEs that a local government owns on behalf of the local citizens.
In order to maximize the welfare of the “ultimate shareholders,” it would
be—in appearance—rational for SOEs to pursue the monopoly profit
maximization strategy, by charging the high monopoly price (i.e., Pm) and
producing the low level of quantity (i.e., Qm).

160

Li-Wen Lin & Curtis J. Milhaupt, We Are the (National) Champions: Understanding
the Mechanisms of State Capitalism in China, 65 STAN. L. REV. 697, 699 (2013) (citing
State-Owned Assets Supervision & Admin. Comm’n of the State Council, Central SOEs,
http://www.sasac.gov.cn/n2963340/n2971121/n4956567/4956583.html). “Many other
Chinese firms on the Fortune Global 500 are SOEs controlled by provincial or local
governments.” Id. at 699 n.5.
161
See China to Push Forward Reform of State-Owned Companies, CCTV (May 9, 2012,
18:58), http://english.cntv.cn/program/newshour/20120509/118402.shtml (explaining
briefly monopolistic features of Chinese SOEs and future reforms).
162
For example, at the central government level the State-Owned Assets Supervision and
Administration Commission of the State Council (SASAC), an organ of the party-state,
supervises many SOEs. See Lin & Milhaupt, supra note 160, at 700 (explaining that “[the
SASAC] has been described as ‘the world’s largest controlling shareholder’”) (citing
Marcos Aguiar et al., SASAC: China’s Megashareholder, BCG PERSPECTIVES (Dec. 1,
2007),
http://www.bcgperspectives.com/content/articles/globalization_strategy_sasac_chinas_meg
ashareholder).
163
See Clarke, supra note 32, at 499.
164
More precisely, the citizens of China are not formally “shareholders” of SOEs. Instead,
the controlling shareholder of Chinese SOEs is the government. Accordingly, the citizens
of China are “beneficiaries” under the government. Nonetheless, this Article bases its
explanations on the notion that the citizens of China are “ultimate shareholders” of SOEs,
since such an analysis is functionally correct.
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In the above analysis, however, one important point is not taken
into account. In general, consumers and shareholders are different groups,
even if it is possible that a shareholder group constitutes a subset of
consumers. Under this general view, one main issue related to (quasi)
monopoly profits is the wealth transfer from a consumer group to a
shareholder group. In an imperfectly competitive market, the shareholder
group is better off and the consumer group is worse off.165 Although the
shareholder primacy norm would be counterproductive to social welfare as
a whole, at the very least the norm is beneficial to the shareholder group in
an industrial organization with monopoly or oligopoly. However, this
general analysis is unlikely to apply to (quasi) monopoly SOEs
particularly when the government holds 100% ownership (or a high
percentage of ownership). 166 In such cases, “ultimate shareholders” of
SOEs are, roughly speaking, the same as consumers in the domestic
market.167 For instance, an SOE owned by a local government provides a
certain service to local consumers, who are actually “ultimate shareholders”
of the SOE.
Under these circumstances, consider the impacts of the
shareholder wealth maximization norm—if it is strictly pursued by
Chinese SOE managers—on the welfare of the “ultimate shareholders.”
The norm increases the profits of an SOE, for the benefit of the “ultimate
shareholders.” On the other hand, the welfare of consumers is hurt by the
monopoly profit maximization. Technically speaking, a substantial
amount of surplus is transferred from consumers to the “ultimate
shareholders.” Since two conceptually divided groups are actually one
group, the transfer of resources simply takes place from a person’s right
pocket to the left pocket. One critical problem is that the size of DWL—
visually depicted as Harberger’s triangle—is enlarged during the course of
such a transfer. Consequently, the shareholder wealth maximization norm
will result in a net loss to the “ultimate shareholders.”
Suppose that “consumer primacy”—rather than shareholder
primacy—is pursued as the main policy of SOEs in China. On the one
165

See KRUGMAN & WELLS, supra note 6, at 371.
When the government holds 100% ownership of an SOE, in theory, the citizens of
China as a group holds 100% ownership via the government.
167
It is noteworthy, however, that there are SOE cases where “ultimate shareholders”
would not be same as “consumers.” First, by means of voting leverage devices such as
stock pyramiding, it is possible that the government can control an SOE with a fractional
ownership (e.g., 25%). In this example, while the citizens of China (as a group) are
“consumers,” they account for merely 25% of “ultimate shareholders.” Accordingly, the
group of “ultimate shareholders” is a subset of the group of “consumers.” Second, suppose
that an SOE is run by a local government, but provides goods or services to all citizens of
China. Even if the SOE is wholly owned by the local government, two groups would not
be same. These situations are beyond the scope of this Article, and will be explored in
more depth by my future research projects.
166
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hand, a certain portion of profits—that an SOE could have collected, if the
profit maximization strategy had been pursued—for the “ultimate
shareholders” would be given up. This portion is obviously a loss (or an
opportunity cost) to the citizens of China. On the other hand, as a large
consumer group, the citizens of China will benefit from a lower price
(which is lower than Pm and approaches Pc) and a higher quantity (which
is higher than Qm and approaches Qc). The combined effect is more
desirable to the citizens of China. For this reason, given that the current
regime of monopolistic SOEs is firmly established in Chinese market and
legal systems—thus, impractical to reform on a large scale in the short
term—pursuing a policy that is purely in line with the shareholder wealth
maximization norm could generate unintended negative consequences.
As discussed, Roe made an argument that the shareholder wealth
maximization norm is not fit for a (quasi) monopoly economy, since it
reduces national welfare. 168 I argue that the shareholder wealth
maximization norm is not fit for at least some Chinese SOEs, since it can
be harmful to the “ultimate shareholders,” not to mention that it risks
lowering social welfare. Table 3 summarizes the above analysis.
Although Table 3 provides a simplified framework, it is a good start for
future research on the welfare of consumers and “ultimate shareholders”
of Chinese SOEs.169
Table 3: Welfare of Ultimate Shareholders of Chinese SOEs When Profits Are
Maximized (Analysis Based on Figure 1)

Wealth Transfer -- (i)
Deadweight Loss -- (ii)
(i) + (ii)
Total Benefit/Cost
168

BENEFIT/COST AS
SHAREHOLDERS

BENEFIT/COST AS
CONSUMERS

+A

–A

–C
[+ A – C] --- (iii)

–B
[– A – B] --- (iv)

[A – C] + [– A – B] = [– B – C]

See supra text accompanying note 12.
Note that the underlying assumption of Table 3 is that the “ultimate shareholder” group
is roughly same as consumer group. In regard to this assumption, additional issues that
will be further analyzed in an independent project are as follows: (1) How are outcomes in
Table 3 different, if an SOE has consumers in foreign countries?; (2) How does CMS—
when it dilutes the government’s ownership very much—affect the analysis in Table 3?;
(3) What if a province government owns an SOE that also has consumers in other
provinces?; and (4) How does (and can) an SOE really distribute benefits to its “ultimate
shareholders”?
169
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of Ultimate
Shareholders [(iii) +
(iv)]




Notation (based on supra Figure 1 and supra Part II.B.1)
A: Rectangle A
B: Triangle B
C: Triangle C
+ : Benefit
– : Cost
Shareholder Group = Consumer Group
Thus, under the shareholder wealth maximization norm in a
(quasi) monopoly, the total benefit/cost of “ultimate
shareholders” is: (iii) + (iv) = [A – C] + [– A – B] = [– B –
C]. Accordingly, the shareholder wealth maximization norm
will result in a net loss to “ultimate shareholders” in Chinese
SOEs.

V.
CONCLUSION
In The Shareholder Wealth Maximization Norm and Industrial
Organization, Roe raised a significant and fundamental question, namely,
whether the shareholder wealth maximization norm is fit to be the global
corporate governance standard in countries dominated by (quasi)
monopolies. Despite his huge contribution in this uncharted territory
between industrial organization and corporate governance, Roe did not
cover important issues such as CMS, tunneling, and the application of
shareholder primacy to the Chinese economy and SOEs. Based on Roe’s
omissions, this Article uses a complex analytical framework to explore the
question of (quasi) monopoly, shareholder wealth maximization, investor
protection, and national welfare.170
When a controller’s economic interests in a (quasi) monopoly
corporation account for only a small fraction (i.e., a deep CMS), the
controller has a weak incentive to follow the profit maximization norm.
Under these circumstances, public shareholders would be damaged due to
the deviation from the maximized-profit point. However, it is generally
expected that consumers and the national economy as a whole would
inadvertently—perhaps without the CMS controller’s bona fide intent—
benefit relative to cases where the shareholder primacy norm is pursued in
a strict manner. The lower a CMS controller’s ownership stake in a

170

See supra Part III and Part IV.
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corporation is, the weaker the incentive to comply with shareholder wealth
maximization.
By definition, tunneling is detrimental to public shareholders. An
interesting byproduct of tunneling in a (quasi) monopoly CMS corporation
is that a CMS controller, ceteris paribus, has an additional incentive to
consider a profit maximization strategy (due to a higher level of the CMS
controller’s economic interests in the corporation) that would be
potentially beneficial to public shareholders. Of course, if the negative
impact of tunneling on public shareholders overwhelms the positive one,
public shareholders would end up with welfare loss. Nonetheless,
commentators should recognize—at least at a conceptual level—the
potentially positive corporate governance feature of tunneling. In addition,
given CMS, tunneling of substantially all corporate assets is the worst
scenario in terms of industrial organization, corporate governance
(investor protection), and social welfare.171
Regarding SOEs in China, the shareholder wealth maximization
norm, if it is strictly transplanted, would create unintended negative
effects to the economy given legal and market institutions in China which
are not easily reformed. Specifically, the norm—which is intended to
protect shareholders and make them better off—will, ironically, lower the
welfare level of the “ultimate shareholders” in Chinese SOEs, not to
mention the detrimental impact of greater monopoly rents on the national
economy.172

171
172

See supra Part III.C.1.
See supra Part IV.
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